The Effect of Solicitation in Collusive Bribery Game
How to cite
Chen, Xi. 2024. "The Effect of Solicitation in Collusive Bribery Game." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014597. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14597-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In the reality, most bribery happen with solicitation. However, most papers analyzing bribery do not contain solicitation. We develop a model to estimate the effect of solicitation in a collusive bribery game. Our experiment will be published on Prolific.
Experimental design
Subjects will be randomly assigned to 2 roles: Government Staff or Citizen. And they will also be randomly assigned into four treatment groups with different level of solicitation. Specifically, different level of solicitation means Government Staff can choose to send a certain fixed sentence.
Citizen have to play a game then report the result to government staff. Government staff then have to report the result to server, but he/she have the right to manipulate the result. Citizen can choose to send some tokens to government staff. And government staff has to choose whether to accept the result or not and whether to manipulate the result or not.
Design details
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