Gender Roles in Risky Household Decisions: A Study in Bangladesh
How to cite
Saha, Koustuv; Ricker-Gilbert, Jacob.
2024. "Gender Roles in Risky Household Decisions: A Study in Bangladesh." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014589.
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14589-1.0
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This study explores intrahousehold decision-making dynamics in rural Bangladesh, focusing on the coordination of risk-taking decisions between husbands and wives across different spheres of control. In these patriarchal households, men predominantly oversee market-related decisions, while women manage household-centric activities. Using an experimental investment portfolio method, we measure individual risk preferences and examine how spouses jointly determine the household’s overall risk exposure. We investigate potential inefficiencies in coordination, considering factors such as conflicting risk preferences and asymmetric frictions in intrahousehold information transfer. Findings will shed light on how households navigate decisions around saving and investing, with implications for designing gender-inclusive interventions. This research is particularly relevant for improving the efficacy of agricultural extension programs, which often overlook the role of women in household decision-making
Intervention
We elicit risk preferences of married couples in agricultural households in rural Bangladesh under different treatments. We vary the incentive structure and decision-making process across treatments. Using a sequential game structure we try to simulate intra-household decision-making in paternalistic societies where the female household member might have to react to decisions made by the primary male household head.
Experimental design
We use a within-subject design. Each household in our sample is subjected to all three treat
Design details
Randomization method
Randomization to decide which treatment will be incentivized in a household is performed on SurveyCTO software in the tablet computers used by the female enumerator dealing with the female respondent in the household. Based on the realized value of a random number with uniform distribution over the following values {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, the respondents in the selected household are paid:
1. There is a 20% chance that the household members will be paid for their performances in the "Solo" game: In this case each enumerator will pay their player their respective winnings from their "Solo" game in addition to the 150 BDT participation bonus,
2. 20% chance that the household members will be paid for their performances in the "Shared" game: In this case each enumerator will pay their player half of the winnings from the lottery they chose in the "Shared" game plus half of the winnings from the lottery their spouse chose in their "Shared" game. In addition, each player will receive the 150 BDT participation bonus.
3. 20% chance that the wife will be paid for her performance in her "Joint-First" game and the husband will be paid for his performance in his "Joint-Second" game: In this case the female (/male) enumerator will pay the wife (/husband) half of the combined winnings from the lottery chosen by the wife in her "Joint-First" game and the lottery chosen by the husband in his "Joint-Second" game. The wife will also each be paid an extra 150 BDT if she correctly predicts her husband’s strategy in his "Joint-Second" game, 100 BDT if she makes only one mistake, and 50 BDT if she makes only two mistakes. Finally, each household member will also receive the participation bonus equal to 150 BDT.
4. 20% chance that the wife will be paid for her performance in her "Joint-Second" game and the husband will be paid for his performance in his "Joint-First" game: In this case the male (/female) enumerator will pay the husband (/wife) half of the combined winnings from the lottery chosen by the husband in his "Joint-First" game and the lottery chosen by the wife in her "Joint-Second" game. The husband will also each be paid an extra 150 BDT if he correctly predicts his wife’s strategy in her "Joint-Second" game, 100 BDT if he makes only one mistake, and 50 BDT if he makes only two mistakes. Finally, each household member will also receive the participation bonus equal to 150 BDT.
5. 20% chance that each household member will be paid 250 BDT in addition to the participation bonus equal to 150 BDT
The reason for the elaborate randomization attached to the payoffs is so that players are not able to deduce which exact game they are being paid for and thus not be able to deduce their spouse's choices for the remuneration received. The enumerators will also not declare to the players their spouse's choices or which game they are being paid for.
Randomization unit
Randomization is used in the experiment to determine which of the treatments will be incentivized in a household. This is done at the individual level. However, every household in the sample is subjected to the four treatment types: Solo, Shared, Joint (Wife as first mover) and Joint (Husband as first mover).
Clusters
Treatment will be provided at the level of the individual (unit of observation) and not at cluster level. So, the number of clusters is same as the sample size that is 1050 households out of which the primary adult male and their wife will be surveyed.
Observations
The planned number of households is 1050 that is 1050 pairs of husbands and wives.
Arms
The experiment has a within-subject design. So, each household is subjected to the four treatments in successive order. So, the entire sample of 1050 households is used in eacg treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
Lottery choice by wife and husband under each treatment, the risk aversion parameters calculated based on the respective lottery choices, and elicited beliefs of respondents about their spouse's choices and through those their risk preferences.
Secondary outcomes
We also collect data on savings and loan taking behavior of both husbands and wives. Comparing their answers within a household also allows us to test for asymmetric information in the household.
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