Political polarization, expectations formation and central bank communication

How to cite

Kuang, Pei; Weber, Michael; Xie, Shihan. 2024. "Political polarization, expectations formation and central bank communication." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014566. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14566-1.0

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Pei Kuang* , Michael Weber , Shihan Xie

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014566
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14566-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2024-04-21 – 2024-05-02
Countries
United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14566

Abstract

This project examines how intergroup preferences among U.S. consumers with different political affiliations influence their macroeconomic expectations, using a large-scale online survey. We collect data on consumers' political affiliations and their perceptions of the U.S. Federal Reserve's political leaning. Our analysis focuses on the heterogeneity in expectation formation between consumers who view the Fed as either an outgroup or ingroup institution, including their behavior in acquiring and processing communications from the Fed.

Experimental design

Participants are asked about their political affiliation. Ingroup favoritism is measured by using an other-other allocation game where participants are invited to allocate a fixed sum of money to a group of one Democrat and one Republican. Additionally, we ask participants about their perception of the political leaning of the U.S. Federal Reserve, specifically whether they believe it leans toward the Democratic Party, Republican Party, no political party, or none of the above. A participant may view the Fed as an ingroup or outgroup institution depending on whether their own political views align with their perception of the Fed’s political stance.

Next, we assess participants' level of trust in the Fed, specifically regarding its ability to manage inflation and unemployment, as well as its concern for the economic well-being of all Americans. Additionally, we ask participants if they are credit-constrained and gather their perceptions and forecasts of inflation, unemployment, interest rates, and their perceived inflation target.

Information demand stage.

We randomly assign participants to two groups: a control group and a treatment group. Treatment group participants enter a game where they can pay to adjust the probability of receiving a news article from different sources. They can choose between two articles about the U.S. economy: one from a news agency (either left-leaning or right-leaning media) and the other from the Federal Reserve. We measure their willingness to pay for information from the Fed versus a left-leaning or right-leaning news source. By default, each article has a 50% chance of being selected. Each participant is given a $2 budget, which they can use to adjust the probability of receiving either article. It costs $1 to change the probability by 10 percentage points.

Information treatment stage

All participants are presented with the same piece of news article with identical wording on the projection of economic conditions. To isolate the effects of news sources on individual belief updating, we present the participants in the treatment group along with the logo of a news agency (either CNN or Fox News) or the Federal Reserve. No logo or source of information is displayed for control group participants.

The probability of receiving news from a specific source for each participant in the treatment group is determined by the choices made during the information demand stage.

Post-treatment stage.

After reading the provided information, participants are asked whether they have heard about the news before and to evaluate its political leaning and reliability. We then examine how participants update their expectations regarding inflation, unemployment, and interest rates after receiving this information.

Hypothetical scenario.

Respondents are asked to consider a hypothetical scenario where Democrats lose the presidency in the next US presidential election. Under this hypothetical scenario, we ask participants to provide their perceptions of political leaning and their trust in the Fed regarding its management of inflation and unemployment, as well as its concern for the economic well-being of all Americans.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomisation by a computer
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
n/a
Observations
5205 adults
Arms
4126 adults
Primary outcomes
Inflation expectations Willingness to pay for information from the Fed Probability of receiving Fed communications

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords