Visual Nudges in Lending
How to cite
Yoon, Joon Sang; Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina; Zhang, Tianyu; Huang, Kanyuan; Tang, Mengwei. 2024. "Visual Nudges in Lending." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014536. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14536-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In this study, we examine whether providing a simple visual nudge by labeling the loan product can change borrowers’ loan choices, potentially helping them make better decisions. We work with a government-backed online lending platform in China. The platform allows borrowers to directly borrow money from banks. Banks will list their loan products on the platform. Any individual with a valid Chinese ID can register with the platform and apply for loans. We randomly assign borrowers into one of the following four groups: 1) a control group with no label; 2) a treatment group where a label is placed on the loan with the lowest interest rate; 3) a treatment group where a label is placed on the loan with the fastest processing time; and 4) a treatment group where a label is placed on the loan with the highest approval rate. By comparing borrowers’ loan choices between the control and treatment groups, we estimate the causal impact of visually salient labels on borrower decision-making in consumer lending.
Intervention
We work with a government-sponsored lending platform in China. When borrowers apply for loans on the platform, the platform will prompt a survey asking the borrower to fill in basic background information, such as education and income range, as well as their requested loan amount maturity, and the ability to provide collateral.
Based on the borrower’s loan application, the platform will recommend five loan products to the borrower. The borrower can apply for one or more of those recommended loans. Once the borrower applies, the bank is notified and will start to process the loan application.
Treatment: Once the borrower completes the survey, she will be randomly assigned to one of the following groups:
a. Control group: no label.
b. Treatment 1: Lowest rate label – we place a label on the loan with the lowest interest rate.
c. Treatment 2: Fastest processing time label - we place a label on the loan with the fastest processing time
d. Treatment 3: Highest success rate label - we place a label on the loan with the highest approval rate.
We observe whether the borrower applies for a loan and which loan product the borrower picks.
Experimental design
We work with a government-sponsored lending platform in China. When borrowers apply for loans on the platform, the platform will prompt a survey asking the borrower to fill in basic background information, such as education and income range, as well as their requested loan amount maturity, and the ability to provide collateral.
Based on the borrower’s loan application, the platform will recommend five loan products to the borrower. The borrower can apply for one or more of those recommended loans. Once the borrower applies, the bank is notified and will start to process the loan application.
Treatment: Once the borrower completes the survey, she will be randomly assigned to one of the following groups:
a. Control group: no label.
b. Treatment 1: Lowest rate label – we place a label on the loan with the lowest interest rate.
c. Treatment 2: Fastest processing time label - we place a label on the loan with the fastest processing time
d. Treatment 3: Highest success rate label - we place a label on the loan with the highest approval rate.
We observe whether the borrower applies for a loan and which loan product the borrower picks.
Design details
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