Competition and Price Transparency: Evidence from Branchless Banking Agents in Indonesia

How to cite

Leon, Gianmarco; Deserranno, Erika; Kanz, Martin; Witoelar, Firman; Gottlieb, Daniel. 2024. "Competition and Price Transparency: Evidence from Branchless Banking Agents in Indonesia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014527. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14527-1.0

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Gianmarco Leon* , Erika Deserranno , Martin Kanz , Firman Witoelar , Daniel Gottlieb

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014527
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14527-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-11-01 – 2025-03-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D82, G28, G41, O14
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14527

Abstract

We partner with one of Indonesia’s largest banks to test how increased transparency and competition in the market for branchless banking influence fees charged to clients and the volume of transactions they do. Our experiment includes four treatment arms: (i) the bank’s branchless banking agents receive information about the expected changes in competition in their area; (ii) banking agents are given an incentivized choice to enroll in a marketing plan that discloses the bank’s official prices or an alternative plan that does not require them to disclose official prices to their customers (at a higher cost); (iii) agents are presented with the choice between the two marketing plans in (ii), but before making the choice, they are informed about the expected changes in competition in their area (as in (i)); and (iv) clients of the bank’s branchless banking agents are directly informed about the official prices for the most common transactions. The experimental design will allow us to estimate the causal effect of (i) changes in competition; (ii) the implementation of full price transparency, and (iii) agents’ willingness to be transparent upon changes in the competition environment.

Intervention

Our design consists of three key interventions: a) Competition Experiment, which examines how competition influences price transparency without offering agents marketing choices, b) Choice Experiment, which explores the effects of competition when agents are offered a marketing choice, and c) Transparency Experiment, which focuses on the demand-side impact of price transparency, particularly estimating market returns. Agents (and their clients) are randomly assigned to either the Pure Control group or one of four treatment groups (T1, T2, T3, T4). The Pure Control group receives no interventions. Below, we describe the interventions to be administered in T1, T2, T3, and T4.

T1 – Competition Treatment:

Agents assigned to this treatment group will receive information on the predicted changes in competition from other branchless banking agents in their area. This information will be presented during on-line survey to agents (right after the administration of baseline survey).

T2 – Choice experiment:

Agents assigned to this group will be presented with a choice between two marketing plans: (i) the bank will provide the agent with a (digital) poster displaying the official prices for three of the most common transactions; (ii) the bank will directly send all the clients of the agent a (digital) poster displaying the official prices for three of the most common transactions. The choice will be incentivized, with (ii) being a more costly choice than (i). This choice will be presented to agents during the on-line survey (right after the administration of baseline survey) and their choice will be implemented by the bank.

T3 – Choice experiment + Competition:

In addition to the choice between the marketing plans (T2), agents assigned to this group will receive information on the predicted changes in competition from other branchless banking agents in their area (as in T1). This information will be presented just before they are asked to make a choice between the two marketing plans.

T4 – Transparency treatment:

Clients of the randomly selected agents assigned to this treatment arm will directly receive a (digital) poster displaying the official prices for three of the most common transactions via the bank’s official WhatsApp account.

Experimental design

The design consists of three key interventions: a) Competition Experiment, which examines how competition influences price transparency without offering agents marketing choices, b) Choice Experiment, which explores the effects of competition when agents are offered a marketing choice, and c) Transparency Experiment, which focuses on the demand-side impact of price transparency, particularly estimating market returns.

Agents are randomly assigned to either the Pure Control group or one of four treatment groups (T1, T2, T3, T4). The Pure Control group receives no interventions, serving as a baseline. T1 receives information on competition without marketing choices, while T2 is offered marketing choices without competition information. T3 combines both interventions – competition information and marketing choices. T4 is part of a transparency experiment, where clients of the randomly selected agents will receive a price poster directly from the bank.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization will be done through Qualtrics.
Randomization unit
Individual agents.
Clusters
10k agent responses
Observations
10k agent responses and 50k client responses (assuming we can get responses from 5 clients per agent)
Arms
2k agent responses per treatment group
Primary outcomes
The main goal of the experiment is to determine the effects of competition and transparency on (i) prices charged to clients for each transaction, and (ii) the frequency and volume of transactions. We will collect information on (i) through on-line surveys with clients, and on (ii) from administrative data provided by the bank. In our Choice Experiment (T2 and T3), we will measure the effects of our treatments on their willingness to disclose official prices by measuring their incentivized choice of marketing plans. Primary Outcome (Explanation) If some of your outcomes will be constructed (e.g. "women empowerment") please provide a description of how the outcome will be constructed from the main variables. -Prices charged for the last transaction made with a branchless banking agent: Our on-line surveys with clients will include questions asking about the last transaction the client did with their most frequent branchless banking agent, as well as the fee charged for that transaction. -Frequency and volume of transactions: Administrative data provided by the bank, combined with data from customer follow-up surveys, will allow us to measure the frequency and volume of transactions done with each agent participating in our study, allowing us to measure the effects of the treatments on these variables. -Agent expectations: We will examine how randomized information about the expected increase in agents in their local area shifts agents’ expectations of competition (T1, T2, T3). -Agents’ willingness to disclose official prices: In T2 and T3, we will present agents with an incentivized elicitation exercise in which they will be presented with a choice between two different marketing plans that the bank is planning to implement. To incentivize the choice, each plan will have a different cost and every agent will receive an endowment of IDR25,000 which can be used to buy one of these plans (the endowment will be provided on top of the compensation given for responding to the survey). The plans differ in whether information about the bank’s official prices will be disclosed directly to the agent’s customers or sent to the agent, which preserves the agent’s ability to shroud prices and engage in price discrimination. The two plans are described below: Plan A. The agent will receive a WhatsApp message from the bank containing the bank’s official price list for the most widely used types of branchless banking transactions. Agents will be told that they are free to forward this message to clients at their discretion. The cost of this plan will be set at IDR25,000. Plan B. The bank will directly send a WhatsApp message to all of the agent’s clients containing information about the bank’s official price list for the most widely used types of branchless banking transactions. The cost of this plan will be set at IDR20,000 (therefore, the agent gets to keep IDR5,000 from the endowment). After the agent makes a choice, we will follow through and implement the plan chosen. Note that plan A allows the agent to keep the option of shrouding information and to price discriminate between clients. Agents who have a preference for keeping this option will have to take the costly action of selecting the most expensive plan. Plan B instead is equivalent to full transparency, and will not require agents to pay a premium. The results from the choice experiment will allow us to determine whether higher expected levels of competition lead to a higher willingness to disclose the bank’s official price list (price transparency), or alternatively, whether shrouding can be sustained at different levels of competition.
Sponsors
Name: The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab Southeast Asia’s Inclusive Financial Innovation Initiative (IFII) Url: https://www.povertyactionlab.org/initiative/inclusive-financial-innovation-initiative

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