Wage transparency and farm employment—Experimental evidence from Nigeria

How to cite

Aremu, Olayinka; Meemken, Eva-Marie. 2024. "Wage transparency and farm employment—Experimental evidence from Nigeria." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014487. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14487-1.0

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Olayinka Aremu* , Eva-Marie Meemken

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014487
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14487-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-07-01 – 2024-11-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14487

Abstract

Farm labor shortages (i.e., unfilled labor needs), despite high levels of underemployment, in many Sub-Saharan African countries present a paradox. This paper will investigate one possible explanation: the asymmetry of wage information in rural labor markets, which contributes to inaccurate wage expectations and, in turn, farm labor mismatches and shortages. Using a crowd-sourced information experiment, we will investigate how aggregate wage information provision affects labor market outcomes, such as wages, farm labor supply, and labor shortages.

Experimental design

The planned study is a cluster randomized control experiment with one information treatment. Participants will be randomly assigned to the treatment arm at the village level instead of opting for randomization at the individual (farmer or worker) level. Although randomizing at the individual level would increase statistical power, it was ruled out due to concerns about treatment spillover—i.e., externalities on untreated participants. For instance, if multiple farms operate in the same community, treating only one may lead to treatment spillover among untreated participants. This could result in biased treatment effect estimates when comparing different experiment arms. While randomizing at the village level reduces the risk of treatment spillover to some extent, it still poses a treatment spillover risk since some villages in our study are in close proximity. Therefore, the random assignment procedures for the allocation of villages to treatment arms will follow a two-step randomized design. In the first step, each of the 5 LGAs is randomly assigned a proportion p (0%, 50%, or 100%) of villages to receive information treatment. In the second step, within each LGA, a fraction P of all villages will be randomly selected into treatment arms. The two-step randomized design also allows us to account for possible spillovers by comparing LGAS where some villages are treated (contaminated group) to those LGAs with no treated villages (pure control groups) or those in villages where everyone is treated (pure treatment group).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer using STATA
Randomization unit
Village level
Clusters
88 villages
Observations
247 Farmers and 280 Casual (daily) Workers
Arms
45 villages in the control group (127 Farmers and 142 Workers) 43 villages in the treatment group (120 Farmers and 138 Workers)
Primary outcomes
1. Wages paid by farmers 2. Maximum wage farmers would be willing to offer 3. Wages received by workers 4. Reservation wages (workers) 5. Days worked (workers) 6. Unfilled labor needs (farmers)
Secondary outcomes
At the farm level, the total number of workers needed on the farm in the past seven days and the perceived community-level wage (Naira/day) over the past seven days. At the worker level, number of days worked in self-employment and on one's own or household farm during the past seven days, and the perceived community-level wage (Naira/day).

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Keywords