Examining the Effects of Outside Options on Matching Outcomes in the DA Mechanism: An Experimental Approach

How to cite

Yurko, Anna. 2024. "Examining the Effects of Outside Options on Matching Outcomes in the DA Mechanism: An Experimental Approach." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014481. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14481-4.0

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Anna Yurko*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014481
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14481-4.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2024-09-30 – 2026-03-30
Countries
Russian Federation ()
JEL codes
D47, I21, I24, I28
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14481

Abstract

In countries with centralized admission systems, some applicants have access to outside options. This study aims to analyze how the presence of attractive outside options for some applicants affects the decisions of all applicants in a centralized admission system under the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. I consider two cases: 1) when the length of the ranked ordered list (ROL) of educational programs that applicants can submit is unconstrained, and 2) the case of constrained ROLs.

The main focus is on the case of constrained ROLs, as theory predicts that when ROLs are constrained in length, the availability of attractive outside options for some applicants can influence the optimal strategies adopted by all participants, including those without such outside options. Additionally, this study examines whether integrating the outside option into the centralized admissions system impacts the decisions of applicants and the resulting matching characteristics.

Intervention

Participants in the experiment will be assigned to groups of 24 individuals. Each group will compete for one of three prize types:

1) Prize A: 600 rubles (approximately $6.50 at current exchange rate)
2) Prize B: 400 rubles ($4.33)
3) Prize C: 200 rubles ($2.17)

In each group, a total of 6 prizes of each type will be awarded. Consequently, no more than 18 participants per group will receive a prize in the baseline version with no outside option available. The language used is neutral and not tied to the university admissions context.

Whether a participant receives one of the prizes depends on their own decisions, the decisions made by the other group members, and a random component. The prizes will be distributed according to the following process:
1. Each participant in the experiment submits a rank-ordered list of the prizes, with their most preferred prize listed first and their least preferred prize listed last.
2. Participants in the experiment are randomly assigned numbers from 1 to 24. A lower participant number indicates higher priority eligibility for the prizes.
3. The prizes are distributed according to the deferred acceptance algorithm.

The goal of the study is to analyze how participants' decisions on what ROLs to submit depend on their access to an outside option, and for those without access, how their decisions depend on knowing that other participants have access to an attractive outside option. Therefore, in the treatment groups, some participants will have access to an outside option of 500 rubles ($5.41).

Another goal is to investigate how integrating the outside option into the centralized prize distribution system affects participants' decision-making, in comparison to the control group and the treatment group with the non-integrated outside option.

In groups where the outside option is not integrated into the centralized prize distribution system, participants with an outside option (call it prize O) will receive 500 rubles if they do not win Prize A at the conclusion of the algorithm. Prizes B and C that are vacated will be redistributed to other participants without outside options, based on their submitted ROLs and priority numbers assigned in the second stage.

In groups where the outside option is integrated into the centralized prize distribution system, participants with access to the outside option Prize O will need to include it in their ROLs in order to be considered for that option.

Experimental design

The experiment is conducted in a total of seven versions:
I. Unconstrained ROLs:
I.1) Control condition: no outside option for any participants;
I.2) Treatment: outside option is integrated (embedded) into the centralized system, available for 1/3 of participants;
I.3) Treatment: outside option is available for 1/3 of participants, but not integrated into the centralized system.
II. Constrained ROLs, participants can list only two out of the three available prize types:
II.1) Control condition: no outside option for any participants;
II.2) Treatment: outside option is integrated into the centralized system, available for 1/3 of participants;
II.3) Treatment: outside option is integrated into the centralized system, available for 2/3 of participants;
II.4) Treatment: outside option is available for 1/3 of participants, but not integrated into the centralized system.

The experiment is conducted on paper. The majority of participants take part in two versions of the experiment. For each version, participants are required to submit 12 separate ROLs. The final winnings are randomly determined based on one of the 12 submitted lists.

All participants receive detailed instructions on the rules of the prize draw and an example of the DA algorithm. Following the instructions, the participants take a quiz on the structure of the experiment and the DA algorithm, and quiz performance earns points exchanged for monetary compensation (up to 400 rubles or approximately $4.33).

Following the main experiment, participants also complete a bomb risk elicitation task designed to assess their risk preferences. This additional task is included because the degree of risk aversion can influence the optimal strategies of the participants in the main experiment. The bomb risk elicitation task is accompanied by financial incentives, with an expected average payout of 250 rubles ($2.71) per participant.

Design details

Randomization method
By computer.
Randomization unit
Participants are recruited from first-year Bachelor's degree students at the International College of Economics and Finance and the Faculty of Economics (NRU HSE, Moscow). They are also recruited from first-year Bachelor's degree students from Saratov State University, Faculty of Mathematics and Mechanics and Institute of Physics. First-year BSc students are organized into academic groups of 25-30 for their studies, and the experimental sessions are conducted separately for each academic group. Randomization of students into the different versions of the experiment occurs at the individual and academic group level. However, since there are more academic groups than versions of the experiment, and most participating students take part in two versions of the experiment, each group of 24 participants for each version is composed of randomly drawn (by computer) participants from all academic groups participating in the same version of the experiment. Participants are informed that they are not necessarily competing for prizes with the people in the same room, but potentially with any other 23 out of all participating students.
Clusters
400 individuals
Observations
400*2 = 800 individual-version observations. Most of the 400 participants take part in 2 versions of the experiment.
Arms
On average, there are 33 participants per treatment group per type. As each individual will take part in two different versions of the experiment, this should result in an average of 66 individuals per treatment.
Primary outcomes
Unconstrained and constrained ROLs: 1) Proportion of participants who truthfully/optimally reported their preferences in all 12 of their submitted ROLs 2) Average share of truthful/optimal ROLs submitted by participants 3) Average share of ROLs with the top prize type A as first priority (out of 12) Constrained ROLs only: 4) Average share of ROLs with top prize type A (out of 12): lack of A in ROL indicates more cautious strategy

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