Effectiveness of Information Manipulation - An Experimental Investigation of Informational Autocracies
How to cite
Höhne, Christian; Gallo, Edoardo. 2024. "Effectiveness of Information Manipulation - An Experimental Investigation of Informational Autocracies." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014479. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14479-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The purpose of this project is to investigate if communication by a group leader can increase contributions to a public good by the other group members if the communicated information is unverifiable and incentives between the leader and members are misaligned. This is to experimentally approximate the environment of informational autocracy (Guriev and Treisman, 2019, 2020) while abstracting from the existence of motivated beliefs and identity.
Experimental design
To model this decision environment, we use a game design combining dynamics of public good (PG) and trust games. Four participants -- of Type A -- can contribute to a public good, while one player -- Participant B -- can either add to or embezzle from the public good. Participant B thus plays a version of TG with multiple investors, while Participants of Type A play a PG with uncertain return.
The payoff for Participants of Type A depends on three components: their individual contribution to the public good, contributions by other Type A's and Participant B's action. Type As know their own contribution, the final size of the group account, and their payoff for each round. They may also receive information about the composition of contributions leading to the final size of the public good, that is overall contributions by all Participants of Type A and Participant B's action choice.
We experimentally vary whether the provided information is verifiable to Participants of Type A and whether it can be manipulated by Participant B. This way we can identify differences in contribution and embezzlement behavior under different informational regimes and evaluate the effectiveness of information manipulation.
Design details
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