Driving Electric Rides: Experimental Evidence on Vehicle Access Contracts, Labor Productivity, and Driver-Firm Incidence
How to cite
Lee, Narae; Seo, Hee Kwon; Park, David Sungho; Lee, Yoomin; Merfeld, Joshua; Yoon, Chungeun. 2024. "Driving Electric Rides: Experimental Evidence on Vehicle Access Contracts, Labor Productivity, and Driver-Firm Incidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014462. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14462-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We examine how asset-access contracts shape labor productivity and the distribution of returns between workers and firms, drawing on randomized and natural experiments with motorcycle drivers and electric-vehicle (EV) fleet and battery firms in Nairobi. Offering applicants a fixed-wage opportunity to drive EVs increases daily labor hours by 1.37 hours (17 percent) and earnings by USD 1.8 (27 percent), while reducing gasoline expenditures by USD 1.4 (57 percent). Transitioning drivers from the fixed-wage contract to a lease-to-own (LTO) arrangement raises labor hours by 3.52 hours (38 percent) and earnings by USD 4.2 (33 percent), and lowers gasoline consumption by USD 0.45 (20 percent). Treating energy as an intermediate input, we augment drivers’ value-added production function with the labor-effort first-order condition, estimate post-LTO parameters, and backcast them to pre-LTO data to evaluate productivity dynamics and the incidence of returns. Within two months, LTO increases labor productivity by 37 percent through greater income and time flexibility, raises battery-vendor revenues net of grid-electricity costs by USD 1.48 (44 percent), and shifts the fleet supplier toward a mo financially sustainable
model. Despite longer work hours, drivers’ average short-run welfare remains unchanged under LTO, although job-satisfaction and mental-health measures remain stable. A one year follow-up survey is completed and long-term consequences and counterfactual analyses are underway as of March, 2026.
Intervention
1) Guaranteed salary hiring scheme for drivers on fixed labor hours and wage contracts, 2) Lease-To-Own asset access program for Electric Vehicles (EVs)
Experimental design
In the first phase of the experiment, we recruit taxi drivers and randomly assign them to either a treatment group (using an EV-based platform taxi hiring) or a control group. We track labor and other outcomes for those hired on a fixed salary, compared to those who remain self-employed. In the second phase, we examine the labor dynamics, driving behavior, market welfare, and other impacts as drivers transition from the EV-based platform model back to self-employment under an EV Lease-To-Own program.
Design details
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