On the mechanics of kleptocratic states: Administrators’ power, protectors, and taxpayers’ false confessions
How to cite
sierra, Raul Sanchez de la; Samii, Cyrus; Prichard, Wilson; Pailer, Laura; Henn, Soeren. 2016. "On the mechanics of kleptocratic states: Administrators’ power, protectors, and taxpayers’ false confessions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001443. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1443-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Powerful state administrators can take advantage of their positions to extract resources,
especially when political accountability is broken. We conjecture that administrators’ power depends
on their ability to inflict harm using the power of office, their ability to mobilize powerful
networks, and on their privileged access to information. Measuring transfers to administrators
is challenging, because they often involve secrecy, and surveys often draw on recall. To circumvent
this challenge, we develop a smart phone application, and monitor 400 households of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to privately report every day the universe of payments made
during 5 months. The DRC offers a well-suited environment, because administrators systematically
use their power to extract payments from citizens at unusually high rates. We deploy
three randomized interventions aimed to affect the balance of power between administrators
and households. First, since administrators systematically take advantage of a tax code that
is extremely confusing, we organize pro-bono weekly tax consulting to a group of households.
Second, to affect the bargaining power that stems from unequal access to social networks, we
extend a link from a reputed civil society organization to randomly selected citizens. The organization
uses its political leverage to protect the selected citizens. Third, we organize a city-wide
campaign to expose administrators known to have committed abuses in a random sample of
neighborhoods.
Experimental design
We randomly sampled 576 households and 384 businesses on 96 avenues in Kinshasa to participate in household and business surveys (Sampling was implemented in August and September 2015). From this pool, the research team recruited households and businesses to participate in an additional smart phone data collection activity (We further randomized how we framed the invitations to participate in the smart phone data collection activity for all those who were eligible. This is a separate experiment.) A respondent was considered eligible for recruitment into the smart phone data collection activity if they were literate enough to read or write a letter in French and if the enumerator assessed them as having been willing to participate in the survey. If a respondent met these conditions and the target for the avenue had not yet been reached, the enumerator invited the respondent to take part in the smart phone data activity. Note that the targets for the avenues were per-determined and based on the first step of the random assignment, with a target of 200 households and 200 businesses. To ensure that the subsample of participants in the smart phone survey was random conditional on eligibility constraints, enumerators visited households on each avenue in a random order. Enumerators then invited households who agreed to participate in the smart phone data collection activity to attend training at the office of the research team in Kinshasa. A local research team then provided, at the trainings in the office, instructions on how to use the smart phones and on how to enter and upload their tax data on a weekly basis for up to 20 weeks. The research team recruited households on a rolling basis as enumerators implemented the survey (Approximately eight weeks of training were held). In return for their regular reporting, participants received a small compensation (Participants were allowed to keep the smart phones at the conclusion of the study). The training emphasized that the smart phone data collection activity was being undertaken by the same research team that had conducted the household and business surveys. A few days after the end of the smart phone training, individuals were contacted by an ODEP advisor to learn about the ODEP tax activities and to indicate their willingness to participate (The ODEP advisors used the following script: "I am a representative from ODEP, an emerging organization that works to improve the fiscal system in the DRC and to help households better confront the complex fiscal administration of the DRC, and the frequency of abuses by tax collectors. We are partly funded by DFID, the British development organization, and we sit at the table with the government in order to guarantee transparency of their decisions. We represent no political interest, except the interest of the people, and aim to improve the Congolese ability to operate in this predatory and confusing tax environment. You can contact us at x and our website is xxxx.xxx. We are in no way connected to the data collection training that you received or the data collection itself. We are contacting you because we have been informed you are concerned about your taxes, and we are going to make weekly calls to you in order to provide you with support on your taxes. We really hope that our support will help improve the fiscal problem in the DRC. Too many taxes are paid to private interests as a burden to households and we want to help you. Everyone would rather prefer that what you pay goes to public coffers so you can benefit from services the state owes you, isn't it the case?'' The ODEP tax advisor then proceeded to obtain consent and record the contact information for those who were willing to participate in the ODEP consulting activities.)
Experiment 2: Anti-corruption campaign
After having gathered the data, we implemented a campaign in 50 % of the neighborhood of Kinshasa. The campaign aimed at increasing the cost of engaging in abusive expropriation by the lower level tax officials in the targeted neighborhoods. The campaign started with meetings with community mayors and neighborhood leaders, where the organization explained they would start exposing individual tax collectors suspected of abuse to the public and to their supervisors. They presented in each neighborhood a detailed list of abuses that they have recorded. In addition, they communicated with key relevant supervisors to communicate the abuses that took place in the selected neighborhoods. For the first 3 months of the data collection, the campaign was not implemented. Then, a random sample of neighborhoods were selected to receive the targeted campaign at the start of the 4th month. This allows us to use within neighborhood design, and differences in differences. We obtain 70 neighborhoods, 35 in treatment and 35 in control, with daily data during 4 months (pre-campaign is 3 months, post-campagin is 1 month). In addition, we use a target of 400 smartphone holders to examine the impact of the campaign.
To ensure that only some neighborhoods are treatment, we also made sure that the campaign guaranteed that they could only operate in the treatment neighborhoods, due to limited resources. The control neighborhoods receive the guarantee that no matter what they do, ODEP cannot use information there.
Design details
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