Victim Preferences for Punishment
How to cite
Zuckerman, David. 2024. "Victim Preferences for Punishment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014382. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14382-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Society often punishes the offender after a transgression. This study examines whether and to what extent a victim's preference for punishment influences (third-party) decisions on how to punish the offender. We do so in an online lab setting, where the transgression and punishment are both monetary in nature. In a follow-up study, we investigate whether individuals believe third parties *should* consider the victim's preferences when deciding how to punish offenders.
Intervention
Third parties are informed that in a prior study, one participant (the "offender") took $5 from another (the "victim"). The third parties will decide how much to lower the offender's payment (with each third-party choice having a chance of being implemented). Before making their decision, third parties are provided with information about the victim's desired level of punishment. Some third parties are assigned a victim who wants their offender punished the maximum amount ($15); others are assigned a victim who does not want any punishment at all.
In two additional conditions, instead of receiving information about the victim's preferences, the third party is informed about a random bystander's preference. Some third parties are assigned a bystander who wants the offender punished the maximum amount ($15); others are assigned a bystander who prefers no punishment.
Experimental design
We will conduct the experiment on the online platform Prolific.
The experiment consists of two parts: a pre-study and a main study. Below, we outline the pre-study, which sets the stage for the main study.
Note: In the actual experiment, we avoid loaded terms such as "offender," "victim," or "punishment." These terms are used here for clarity.
Pre-study
In the pre-study, we recruit pairs of participants. Each pair completes a short Greek transcription task (previously used in real-effort task studies, such as Augenblick et al. 2015), taking approximately 3 minutes. Both participants receive a prospective bonus of $10. One participant is given the option to take $5 from the other. We focus on pairs where the $5 was taken. The participant who took the money is referred to as the “offender,” and their partner as the “victim.” The victim is informed that $5 was taken and that they now have $5, while the offender has $15.
For some pairs, we tell the victim that, in a future study, a participant will decide how much to punish the offender. We clarify that any money taken from the offender will not go to the victim but back to our Prolific account. The victim is then asked, "How much would you like the participant in the future study to reduce [the offender's] bonus by (if at all)?" They choose between $0, $7.50, or $15.
In other pairs, a bystander is recruited on Prolific. The bystander is informed about the events between the victim and the offender and is similarly asked to indicate how much they want the participant in the future study to punish the offender, with the same three options: $0, $7.50, or $15.
We will continue recruiting until we have at least one pair satisfying each of the following conditions:
Pair 1: Victim requests $0 punishment.
Pair 2: Victim requests $15 punishment.
Pair 3: Bystander requests $0 punishment.
Pair 4: Bystander requests $15 punishment.
Note: Although all participants (victims, offenders, and bystanders) will receive a participation fee, only a subset of victim-offender pairs will receive the bonus money. These pairs will be selected randomly, with pairs where the offender took money having a higher likelihood of selection.
Main Study
In the main study, we recruit an additional 200 participants. First, they respond to a hypothetical embezzlement case, used to gauge their punitive tendencies. Next, they are informed that in a previous study, a victim and an offender were each given $10, and the offender took $5 from the victim.
Participants are then randomly assigned to one of four conditions:
Victim - No Punishment: Assigned to Pair 1, participants are told the victim wanted no punishment.
Victim - Max Punishment: Assigned to Pair 2, participants are told the victim wanted the offender punished by $15.
Bystander - No Punishment: Assigned to Pair 3, participants are told the bystander wanted no punishment.
Bystander - Max Punishment: Assigned to Pair 4, participants are told the bystander wanted the offender punished by $15.
Participants decide how much to punish the offender using a slider, selecting any amount between $0 and $15. They are told to take their choice seriously, as it may be implemented: for each victim-offender pair, one participant’s decision will be randomly selected and enforced. However, the victim or bystander will not be informed of the third party’s decision.
After making their choice, participants are asked whether the victim's (or bystander’s) preference influenced their decision, and whether they think it should have influenced their decision. They are also asked how much they think the $5 loss impacts the victim financially, on a scale of 1 (minimal impact) to 5 (maximum impact).
Finally, participants complete demographic questions (age, gender identity, racial identity, income, political ideology).
After the study concludes, one participant's choice will be randomly selected and implemented for each of the four victim-offender pairs.
Design details
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