Upsets in all-pay auctions: an experiment

How to cite

Andersson, Ola; Schouten, Henk. 2024. "Upsets in all-pay auctions: an experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014374. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14374-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Ola Andersson* , Henk Schouten

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014374
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14374-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-09-20 – 2024-11-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14374

Abstract

We regularly observe a perceived favorite losing out to an unlikely underdog in competitions. We can think of such an upset in terms of an all-pay auction model where a player with a high payoff relevant signal losing to a player with a lower signal. There exist a unique equilibrium in an all-pay auction model with arbitrarily correlated signals and interdependent valuations. The equilibrium is weakly monotone, in which the strong set order orders the bids, and yet, a player with a low signal can under certain correlation structures cause an upset by outbidding a high signal player. The aim of this project is to study this issue by way of an economic experiment.

Intervention

We change the correlation of reward sizes within a bidding group to induce differences in bidding behavior and the occurrence of upsets (weakest bidder winning).

Experimental design

Between treatment, we vary the correlation of valuations in an all-pay auction. The correlation of values in a bidding group can be either negative, independent, or positive. For a given correlation we study bidding and upsets (weakest bidder winning).

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done at session level by experimenters (not authors)
Randomization unit
Treatment is randomized at the session level (each session consist of 24 subjects). We run three different treatments over 3 sessions each. The experiment is run externally by a lab in Vienna. They randomly select which treatment to run on each occasion.
Clusters
36 matching groups (12 in each treatment)
Observations
3*72
Arms
72 in each treatment
Primary outcomes
Bids, upsets(weakest bidder winning the auction), profits

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords