Upsets in all-pay auctions: an experiment
How to cite
Andersson, Ola; Schouten, Henk. 2024. "Upsets in all-pay auctions: an experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014374. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14374-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We regularly observe a perceived favorite losing out to an unlikely underdog in competitions. We can think of such an upset in terms of an all-pay auction model where a player with a high payoff relevant signal losing to a player with a lower signal. There exist a unique equilibrium in an all-pay auction model with arbitrarily correlated signals and interdependent valuations. The equilibrium is weakly monotone, in which the strong set order orders the bids, and yet, a player with a low signal can under certain correlation structures cause an upset by outbidding a high signal player. The aim of this project is to study this issue by way of an economic experiment.
Intervention
We change the correlation of reward sizes within a bidding group to induce differences in bidding behavior and the occurrence of upsets (weakest bidder winning).
Experimental design
Between treatment, we vary the correlation of valuations in an all-pay auction. The correlation of values in a bidding group can be either negative, independent, or positive. For a given correlation we study bidding and upsets (weakest bidder winning).
Design details
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