I Didn’t Know Either - the Dynamics of Strategic Ignorance
How to cite
Hua, Tony. 2024. "I Didn’t Know Either - the Dynamics of Strategic Ignorance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014367. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14367-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
An extensive literature highlights the use of willful ignorance as moral wiggle room to protect one's self-image when choosing to behave selfishly. Although the literature is highly suggestive that people care about their own, internalized self-image, people frequently compare themselves with others when evaluating their own conduct. In the context of willful ignorance, an ignorant person could claim "I am not a bad person for not knowing because there are many others who also did not know." Accordingly, the use of ignorance to mitigate guilt or shame implies different social norms, contingent upon individuals' beliefs about how others may choose to acquire undesirable information. Given the richness of our social environments and our tendency for “social learning,” it is likely the case that the degree to which we exploit moral wiggle room is a function of how we perceive others to behave, with the caveat that such beliefs may be inherently self-serving. Studying the role of beliefs about social norms offers both a broader understanding of the moral wiggle room phenomena and potential mechanisms for addressing willful ignorance. The main goal of this study is an exploration of the interaction between beliefs about social norms and the tendency to exploit ignorance for selfish gains. We present an experiment that studies norming behavior within the moral wiggle room paradigm, using a design that exogenously manipulates subjects’ prior beliefs about social norms.
Intervention
This experiment relies on information provision about the behavior of others.
Experimental design
The experiment is divided into three distinct sections with 6 treatment arms in a 2 by 3 experimental design, varying conditions of whether or not subjects know that they will be playing the moral-wiggle room game and varying conditions of the low versus high ignorance norms and a control condition without any norm information.
The first section elicits subjects' beliefs about the behavior of other subjects. The second section asks subjects to participate in the moral-wiggle room game. The third section asks subjects to rate the social appropriateness of revealing and not revealing the payoff tables.
Design details
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