Payment Schemes and Fairness Experiment 3

How to cite

Becker, Christoph; Trautmann, Stefan; Fehr, Dietmar; Xu, Yilong; Rau, Hannes. 2024. "Payment Schemes and Fairness Experiment 3." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014365. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14365-2.0

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Christoph Becker* , Stefan Trautmann , Dietmar Fehr , Yilong Xu , Hannes Rau

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014365
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14365-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2024-09-18 – 2024-11-30
Countries
Germany ()
JEL codes
D63, D31
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14365

Abstract

Participants in this experiment read the instructions of two different payment mechanisms from a past study. In the past study, subjects played a real-effort slider task in groups of two for four rounds, with their payment being determined by one of the two payment mechanisms. The first mechanism is a tournament that not only awards a higher prize to the winner, but also gives them more time in the next round, while the loser receives less. The second mechanism is a simple piece rate for the number of correctly placed sliders, with no time penalties and rewards. Participants in the current experiment are asked to rate the overall, outcome, and procedural fairness of these two payment mechanisms. At the end, we elicit their willingness to give up part of their fixed payment to make sure that the piece rate is implemented in a lab session, where participants will play the slider task. They are informed that the choice of a randomly drawn participant will be implemented. Half of the participants rating the mechanisms will also get the chance to be invited to these lab sessions.

Intervention

Eliciting fairness ratings for different payment schemes, eliciting willingness to pay for implementing a specific payment mechanism, varying how much participants are affected by their own decision

Experimental design

Main experiment is conducted in an online session with two randomized treatments. Additionally, we conduct two lab sessions in which participants will play the task described in the online survey with one of the payment mechanisms chosen by random participants of the online survey.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization of treatments done by the experimental software
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
320 Participants
Observations
320 Participants
Arms
150 participants in impartial treatment (online) 150 participants in partial treatment (online, 20 of which will be invited to the partial lab session) 20 participants in the impartial lab session
Primary outcomes
(i) Fairness ratings (overall, outcome, procedural) of payment mechanisms (ii) Willingness to pay for implementing a payment mechanism
Secondary outcomes
(i) Demographics (age, gender, political orientation, assessment of life satisfaction)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords