Unraveling Heat
How to cite
Hauser, Helena; Cicala, Steve; Olsen, Morten; Mayr, Harald; Hémous, David. 2024. "Unraveling Heat." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014347. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14347-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study examines the use of adverse selection as a policy tool for taxing negative externalities through voluntary certification. Individuals or firms can choose to reveal their externality level and be taxed accordingly, rather than based on the average for non-certified parties. Parties with below-average externalities benefit from certification, and their choosing the individual taxation raises the tax for the non-certified parties. As the average tax for non-certified parties increases, more individuals are incentivized to opt for certification. Economic theory predicts that this process of separation will continue, and terms this phenomenon as unraveling.
We apply this concept to heat consumption in Switzerland, where residential buildings often lack individual meters. Heating costs are typically allocated based on apartment size, but optional sub-metering could enable billing by actual usage. We test whether offering tenants the option of individual heat bills reduces opposition to sub-metering, even when the theoretical prediction of unraveling is explained.
Experimental design
This experiment examines how people prefer to distribute the costs of a good they consume individually but are billed for as part of a group. Participants choose between two options: paying for their individual consumption or sharing the costs with the group. The experiment compares mandatory versus voluntary adoption of the individual option. It randomly varies the cost of the individual option and an information treatment.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.