Measuring Worker’s Willingness to Comply with Social Norms in Pakistan

How to cite

Shibuya, Sakina; Tirmazee, Zunia; Zahir, Hana. 2024. "Measuring Worker’s Willingness to Comply with Social Norms in Pakistan." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014344. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14344-2.0

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Sakina Shibuya* , Zunia Tirmazee , Hana Zahir

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014344
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14344-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2024-09-30 – 2025-02-28
Countries
Pakistan (Punjab)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14344

Abstract

Pakistan continues to face low participation by women in the labour market despite active involvement by the government to introduce policies encouraging women to work. This study looks specifically at male workers who have at least three years experience working in the production process in garment factories in different parts of Punjab (Pakistan) to determine workers willingness to comply with the social norm of strict physical separation of the sexes. This paper contributes to the literature on the willingness of workers to comply with existing social norms and its impact on participation in the labour market. Understanding the extent to which gender norms can be overcome by economic incentives can help policymakers in developing more nuanced policies in attracting workers to participate in the labour market.

Intervention

To reveal male workers willingness to comply with social norms regarding strict segregation of sexes in garment factories. We use a hypothetical choice method and a behavioural game with the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism.

Experimental design

Marble Sorting Game:
We conduct a marble sorting game with a simplified BDM mechanism to elicit workers’ willingness to comply with social norms that idealize strict physical separation of the sexes. We use a variation of the BDM mechanism called the multiple price list (MPL) method. It has respondents reject or accept different prices, rather than asking them to name their willing prices as in the traditional BDM. The MPL method is applied in the round 2 of the sorting game. In this game, a worker is asked to sort marbles for a short period of time for a monetary prize.
The prize is determined by the quantity he sorts in the given time multiplied by a fixed rate. He is also offered a helper who can help him sort more marbles, thus increasing his prize earnings. Randomly chosen, 50 % of the sample is offered a female helper. If the female helper joins him to play the game, the quantity sorted by her times a different fixed rate will be given to him. His prize earnings, if he plays with the female helper, is the sum of the contributions by him and the female helper.
Each worker plays two rounds. He plays the first round alone, and is offered a helper in the
second round. The second round has the MPL-BDM method, in which the worker is asked to reject or accept five different rates. These rates are for calculating the prize earning based on the quantity sorted by the helper. The worker’s rate is fixed throughout the game. WTC is the lowest of the rates he accepts at which he is willing to play this game with the female helper.
Following the BDM mechanism, whether the worker plays with the female helper and the rate
used to convert her sorted quantity to a monetary prize is determined by a randomly drawn rate
from the uniform distribution of the five rates. This rate is drawn after the top manager reveals
his lowest willing rate. If the randomly drawn rate is greater than or equal to his willing rate, he
plays the game with the female helper and uses the randomly drawn rate for her. If it is less than
his willing rate, he plays alone. This random drawing is the key aspect of the BDM mechanism; it induces truth-telling because the top manager has no control over if he gets to play the game with the female helper.
The other 50% is offered a male helper, which produces a comparison group that enables us to
learn about the roles of potential attributes, other than the helper’s gender, that may affect the
norm compliance price point

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by computer
Randomization unit
Individual worker
Clusters
0
Observations
600 workers
Arms
300 male workers are offered a female helper (treatment) 300 male workers are offered a male helper (control)
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome is workers’ willingness to comply with social norms. The outcome comes from the marble sorting game. This is the lowest willing rate for the helper reported by each top manager. The greater the lowest willing rate is, the more willing he is to comply with the social norm of physical segregation of the sexes

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords