This study investigates the role of incentives on reported macroeconomic beliefs and belief updating following exposure to central bank communication.
Intervention
We exogenously vary the type of incentivisation when eliciting beliefs about the macroeconomy.
Experimental design
With a between-subject design, we assess the role of incentives in macroeconomic belief elicitation.
Design details
Randomization method
It's a between-subject design. Randomisation thus primarily occurs at the end of Prolific.
Randomization unit
Between-subjects
Clusters
n/A
Observations
In wave 1, we have 250 participants per treatment for 1,00 observations. In wave 2, we collect another 250 participants per treatment for 1,000 additional observations. We will have 2,000 participants total.
Arms
We anticipate collecting a total of approximately 250 observations across each of our four treatment conditions for a total of 1,000 observations. Briefly, we base this on the following ex-ante power calculation + logic: Because an interesting and possible outcome in our study is that different incentives do not induce significant treatment effect, we want sufficient statistical power to trust null results. Therefore, our goal is to collect enough data so that we can detect reasonably small effects (Cohen's D of ~ .3) at alpha=.01 and power =.8. Assuming equal variance across treatment, this implies we need approximately 262 participants per treatment (to make all pair-wise comparisons). Our power calculations assume a null effect size of zero and standardized variance of 1, consistent with standard practice for detecting effects in a normal distribution.
Primary outcomes
1) reported baseline inflation expectations
2) changes in these inflation expectations
Secondary outcomes
1) attention to information
2) uncertainty about reported inflation expectations (where collected)
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