Beliefs and attitudes on automation and AI
How to cite
Levi, Eugenio; Stillman, Steven; Boffa, Federico; Battiston, Giacomo; Parmigiani, Alberto. 2024. "Beliefs and attitudes on automation and AI." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014322. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14322-1.4
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Technological change has always been a very debated topic in economics. How Keynes described a future with less work in his letter to his grandchildren has been the object of many controversies over time. We are now experiencing a new wave of technological change, the so-called Robotization and Artificial Intelligence (AI) revolution, with likely stark consequences on productivity and the labour market.
Several studies have delved into the effects of automation and, more recently, artificial intelligence (AI) on the labor market, with findings suggesting a decrease in jobs, especially for low-skilled individuals due to automation, and a wider spectrum of job displacement potential with AI. However, the impact of these changes on attitudes towards technological advancements and political behaviors remains an open question.
Polling data from sources like the Pew Research Center and the Eurobarometer indicate that people generally support technological progress in principle. However, there is a prevalent fear that automation and AI will lead to widespread job loss in the near future, despite many individuals underestimating their own vulnerability to these changes. On the policy front, a partisan divide emerges, with Republicans often opposing increased welfare and taxation, while Democrats tend to advocate for such measures. Meanwhile, within the realm of political science, scholars such as Gallego and Kurer (2022) highlight an anticipated backlash from those negatively affected by technological advancements, even though the aggregate benefits may outweigh the costs. However, the extent of misperceptions surrounding recent technological changes remains poorly understood and warrants further investigation.
Preliminary evidence from political economy studies, such as those by Anelli, Colantone, and Stanig (2021), suggests that exposure to automation could lead to increased support for far-right populist parties, possibly fueled by nostalgia for a perceived golden age. However, more research is needed to elucidate the underlying mechanisms. Additionally, studies by Thewissen and Rueda (2017), Jeffrey (2021), and Van Hoon (2022) shed light on the relationship between automation exposure and preferences for redistribution policies, with mixed findings suggesting a nuanced dynamic, with preferences for redistribution higher for people with higher education, and in situations with a starker rhetoric on unfairness.
Our survey experiment aims to delve deeper into the extent of public misperceptions regarding automation and AI, exploring how different perceptions may shape policy preferences and potentially mobilize voters across three countries—the US, Germany, and Italy. These countries exhibit varying degrees of automation adoption and distinct labor market characteristics, providing a rich context for comparative analysis.
Intervention
Each individuals will see a political statement encompassing a specific vision on automation and AI, except the pure control group.
Experimental design
Part 1: misperceptions on automation and AI
After having collected basic information on demographics and voting intentions, we will acquire two crucial pieces of information: the occupation of the respondent and the industry were he works in. In this way we will be able to assess the exposure of his current or past job to automation. Furthermore, in our empirical analysis, by combining this information with other demographic and social characteristics, we will be able to instrument the current exposure with the expected one by using the approach in Anelli, Colantone and Stanig (2021).
Another relevant part of the introductory questionnaire will collect information on cultural worldviews, so to be able to classify individuals in terms of cultural types between individualist/collectivist and authoritative/liberal using the cultural cognition questionnaire (Kahan et al., 2013).
After having acquired this background information, we will elicit several beliefs related to automation and AI (outcomes a)-c)). Questions a) will be incentivized, as participants will get a bonus fee of $0.50 if they are able to correctly guess the answer to a randomly picked question among those in a). The correct answers will be based on the Institute for Robots statistics for 2022. At the end of this part, we will have open question d) on the respondent’s opinion on the impact of automation and AI on the labour market.
Part 2:
In this part, we explore the influence that visions on technology have on policy preferences and the willingness to mobilize in support of these preferences.
We introduce at the beginning of this part the political statement encompassing a specific vision on automation and AI. The facts within the articles will not change, but the predicted outcomes of automation and AI and the suggested policies will differ between a “techno-optimist”, “techno-pessimist” and a “balanced” spin. Each participant will only see one statement, except for the baseline where no statement is shown. The statements will be followed by control questions to ensure the participants have read and understood the statement.
Later, we will elicit policy preferences. They will be elicited with a) a question on if policy-makers should intervene on automation and AI together with an open question asking for arguments to justify the previous choice, b) radio buttons on the preferred policies among a list of policies from Johnson and Acemoglu (2023). The subsequent part will be on political mobilization, as respondents will be asked to sign an online petition on Change.org. They can choose one out of three petitions based on the statements or not to publicly support any petition.
At the end, we will have a final questionnaire where we will elicit the chances of losing one's own job, additional demographic and socio-economic information, trust in several institutions, risk attitudes, feelings towards technology, information on the personal use of technology. After the survey is over, respondents will be shown a link to the petition on Change.org that they declared they were willing to sign.
Design details
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