Corruption and social capital: an experimental study

How to cite

Pan, Xiaofei; Berdiev, Aziz. 2024. "Corruption and social capital: an experimental study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014316. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14316-1.0

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Xiaofei Pan* , Aziz Berdiev

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014316
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14316-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-09-23 – 2025-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14316

Abstract

We would like to explore the link between corruption and social capital, such as trust, through an online experiment. Specifically, we want to investigate whether public officials are less likely to request bribes when they know their actions are observable by a third party investor. Moreover, we would like to examine whether female public officials behave differently from their male counterparts when their corruptive behavior can be observed by a third party investor. Additionally, we will assess whether reduced corruptive behavior signals greater trustworthiness to future senders and if senders based their trust on public officials' history of bribe requests and rejections. Moreover, we examine sender's trust differences based on their genders. Lastly, we want to investigate the underlying mechanism that may have triggered the behavior differences.

Experimental design

We designed four treatment groups, observability (observable corruption vs. not observable) x gender (male vs female). Each treatment group contains three roles: citizens, public officials and senders.
In all treatment conditions, the citizen completes a task and the public official needs to approve the task for the citizen to receive a reward. The public official could also request a bribe to approve the task and the citizen can reject the request.
Then, the sender is matched with the public official to play a trust game. The senders can base their decisions on the public officials corruption history. The two main treatments differ by whether the public official's request for bribe is observable to the sender. Another dimension is based on the gender of the participants.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization realized through the computer.
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
90 groups in each treatment group, each group has 3 participants assigned into three different roles. Thus, we have about 270 observations for each treatment group.
Observations
About 1080 observations for all four treatments.
Arms
About 270 observations per treatment group, with 90 observations for each role.
Primary outcomes
level of trust; and request for bribe
Secondary outcomes
citizens belief of public official's corruptive behavior

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords