Social Incentives of Non-Elected Leaders in Village Economies
How to cite
Kwak, Minji. 2024. "Social Incentives of Non-Elected Leaders in Village Economies." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014292. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14292-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This document outlines a lab-in-the-field randomized controlled trial (RCT) in rural Malawi, which explores the disparity between the beliefs of villagers and traditional chiefs regarding social subsidy allocation, where hereditary leadership lacks monetary incentives and electoral accountability. The trial also examines the social incentives of traditional chiefs concerning subsidy allocation and the impact of involving villagers and higher-level chiefs as community monitors on policy outcomes (fairness and efficiency) and citizen satisfaction. Specifically, this experiment includes two distinct parts. First, villagers and village chiefs are asked to rank 15 randomly chosen villager profiles in terms of who should receive the social subsidy the most and the least. This project compares the beliefs of village chiefs with those of villagers, as well as with the Proxy Means Test (PMT) score. Following this ranking exercise, the first intervention takes place in the second part: the chiefs are asked to rank another set of 15 randomly chosen villager profiles, with the knowledge that their final rankings will be publicly announced to the villagers through public postings. The second intervention involves informing the chiefs that their final allocation decisions will be shared with their superiors (higher-ranked village chiefs). By comparing the rankings of village chiefs from the first and second parts, this project explores ways to improve the accountability of traditional chiefs.
Intervention
Household head profiles have been randomly assigned to one control group and two treatment groups. Randomly selected villagers in each village, along with the GVH, rank household profiles in each treatment group based on their own thoughts about who should receive the social subsidy. Meanwhile, the VH also ranks the household head profiles, but with different instructions. For the profiles in the control group, the VH ranks them based on their own thoughts, just like the villagers and the GVH. However, for the household head profiles in treatment group 1, there is an additional instruction that the VH's rankings will be shared with the villagers through public postings. Finally, the profiles in treatment group 2 come with the instruction that the VH's rankings will be shared with their superiors, the GVH.
Experimental design
This experiment includes two distinct parts. First, villagers and village chiefs are asked to rank randomly chosen villager profiles in terms of who should receive the social subsidy the most and the least.
Following this ranking exercise, the first intervention takes place in the second part: the chiefs are asked to rank another set of randomly chosen villager profiles, with the knowledge that their final rankings will be publicly announced to the villagers through public postings. The second intervention involves informing the chiefs that their final allocation decisions will be shared with their superiors (higher-ranked village chiefs).
Design details
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