We consider a Lazear-Rosen tournament model involving a tournament administrator (employer or principal) and two agents competing for the prize (the promotion), and test experimentally the principal's inferences and the agents' responses. Specifically, one agent has an exogenous advantage, which is known and observable to the principal. The principal's incentives are designed such that it's in their best interest to design a promotion rule that levels the playing field ex post. We will test whether i) the principals promote optimally and if not, ii) agents anticipate this distortion and adapt effort accordingly.
Intervention
The interventions: 1) In Baseline, the agents are fully symmetric. 2) In Treatment, the agents are asymmetric.
Experimental design
See below.
Design details
Randomization method
First, participants randomly draw a card that assigns them to their computer / cubicle. This determines whether they are a principal or agent, whether they are in baseline or treatment, and also in which matching group of 9 participants they are (cluster). In each round, a group of 1 principal and 2 agents will be formed randomly by the computer (repeated random re-matching). Finally, the agent's error term is randomly drawn by the computer in each round, too.
Randomization unit
We will cluster error terms on matching group level, since there might be correlated error terms within matching group.
Clusters
Matching groups of 9, which means 216/9=24 clusters (matching groups) on which the SE's will be clustered on.
Observations
216 participants, 72 agent type 1, 72 agent type 2, 72 principals.
Arms
We will collect around 200 observations. Given that we have sessions of the size of 18 participants, this will be 216 participants in total. This yields 24 matching groups à 9 participants; and 72 prinicipals, 72 agents of type 1, and 72 agents of type 2.
There will be 2 treatments. Thus, 216/2=108 participants per treatment arm. Of those, in each treatment: 36 principals, 36 agents type 1, 36 agents type 2.
Primary outcomes
1) Principal's choice of the promotion rule, in which they decide how to assign the high prize as a function of the difference of the output of agents (scale: -100 to 100).
2) Beliefs of agents regarding principal's choice of the allocation rule (scale: -100 to 100)
3) Agent's effort provision (effort choice 0 to 100).
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