Post-Marital Settlements and Support Systems in Rural Malawi
How to cite
Barbeta, Anna. 2024. "Post-Marital Settlements and Support Systems in Rural Malawi." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014253. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14253-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project aims to examine the impact of post-marital settlements (i.e., patrilocality and matrilocality) on married women’s social networks in rural Malawi and estimate its effects on informal insurance, social capital, and investment behavior using a lab-in-the-field experiment, self-reported data, and vignette stories.
The lab-in-the-field experiment is structured as follows: women participants will be randomly assigned to roles as either decision-makers or associates. Decision-makers will choose between lotteries with varying levels of risk, while associates will decide when and how much to insure the decision-makers. We will manipulate certain conditions to observe if associates' insurance decisions change based on the risk level chosen by the decision-makers, the proportion of people experiencing losses, and the relationship between the decision-maker and the associate (e.g., relative, in-law, friend, acquaintance, stranger). The study will also explore how decision-makers risk-taking behavior is influenced by the availability of support from associates, the potential for performance comparison with others, and the relationship between the decision-maker and the associate.
Experimental design
We will begin by selecting 6 participants to serve as decision-makers. These decision-makers will then identify their 3 most significant community members for support and their 3 most important kin members. From each list, we will invite the 3rd most relevant individuals to act as “associates.” In each round, decision-makers will be randomly paired
with associates. The decision-makers will choose how much risk to take by selecting one lottery from a
list of two, each with different risk and profit combinations. Meanwhile, the associates will decide
whether and how much to insure. Decision-makers will be informed that associates will have an
endowment of around 1.7$ but the amount shared with the decision-maker will remain private.
Participants will play 2 main games in which different levels of information about the “Decision-Maker”
behavior will be revealed. These 2 games correspond to the main treatment conditions.
The details of each game are as follows:
* No signal round: Without any more information besides the identity of their partner, we ask the associate to choose how much MKW they are willing to give to the "DM” in case she loses the lottery chosen.
• Signal round: In this game, decision-makers choose a lottery to play, aware that their
associates will receive information about the performance of previous players who faced the
same choice between two lotteries. After reviewing the statistics of the losers,
the associates decide how much money to share with the decision-maker in case she loses. Additionally, associates will guess whether the decision-maker is among the people who lost or not.
Decision-makers will play 4 rounds of each of the 2 games, with a different player in each round. To account
for "social distance," decision-makers will play 1 round with a listed associate and the remaining 3
rounds with individuals not on their list. Associates will play 5 rounds, 2 without any information, 2 with information about the loser's statistics, and an additional round with a stranger to serve as a control group.
Design details
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