A living wage vs UBI: Experimental evidence of wage floor framing and anchoring effects on redistributive preferences

How to cite

Schaitberger, Timothy; Yeung, Eddy. 2024. "A living wage vs UBI: Experimental evidence of wage floor framing and anchoring effects on redistributive preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014241. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14241-1.0

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Timothy Schaitberger* , Eddy Yeung

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014241
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14241-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-08-27 – 2024-08-31
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
J08, J38, D63, D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14241

Abstract

In previous decades of rising economic inequality, the developed world saw various local, regional, and even national governments enact living wage policies to increase wages for those at the bottom of the income ladder. More recently, other government programs are testing universal basic income (UBI) payment to fight poverty. Both a living wage and UBI will require public support for plausible implementation, and both are forms of redistribution that don’t rely on means tested welfare benefits. Political and economic literature suggests the framing and numeric anchoring of a policy can influence public preferences, and even a policy proposal frame can shape individual preferences for adjacent policies. This raises the question of how a living wage frame, and a higher minimum wage monetary anchor, affects support for the wage floor and other forms of redistribution, such as UBI. We posit a wage floor frame and anchor, the name and a proposed hourly wage respectively, can influence public attitudes. Furthermore, we hypothesize that a large monetary increase in the wage floor will reduce support for other economic redistribution policies, including UBI. A randomized choice experiment will test these theories by assigning American respondents to different informational treatments. Additionally, we will use Quadratic Voting to measure the intensity of preferences. Our experimental design allows us to estimate the causal effects of framing and anchoring on public attitudes toward the wage floor, as well as the spillover effects on public support for UBI and other redistributive policies.

Intervention

We will recruit 2,000 from the general adult US population in using the platform Prolific. Participants will be redirected to the Qualtrics platform to begin the survey. During the survey participants will be redirected twice to another survey platform, qvsr.io, to complete a Quadratic Voting (QV) ‘game.’

The framing and anchoring experimental treatments are a Living Wage and a $18/hour state wage respectively (see Table 1). Experimental treatments will not be mutually exclusive. The four reference and treatment groups are seen in Table 1 & Figure 1, with vignettes in Table 2 and Figure 2. Participants will be evenly distributed to the four groups.

Experimental design

3. Experimental Design
Our research design employs a choice experiment between a current and alternative public policy, with a frame of the alternative policy acting as the treatment (Elias et al., 2019; Lennon et al., 2022). We diverge from the work of Lennon et al. by testing wage floor preferences, expectations, and support for other redistributive policies, without any prompting of unemployment effects. Additionally, to test the framing effect of the wage name, we manipulate which frame is received by participants. The full survey instrument can be found in the Appendix.
3.1 Sample and Implementation
American citizens aged 18+ will be the study population. We will recruit 2,000 from the general adult US population in using the platform Prolific. Participants will be redirected to the Qualtrics platform to begin the survey. During the survey participants will be redirected twice to another survey platform, qvsr.io, to complete a Quadratic Voting (QV) ‘game.’ Qualtrics employs a function to divide participants to different treatment groups with an equal probability, ensuring fair and equal randomization. An example of the full survey can be found here:
https://kclbs.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_b2B6Ms52zz1GVue.

3.2 Baseline QV
Given the unique nature of a Quadratic Voting Survey, a baseline QV game was used to familiarize participants with the research tool and allow for collecting baseline preferences of participants prior to administering treatments (Cavaillé, Chen & Van Der Straeten, 2019). Participants were shown a brief 90 second video on QV: https://youtu.be/GrY_RzDsqLY. Then a link to a QV game will be provided, where participants will have 25 points to assign to 5 different government policies that they either support or disapprove of each policy. However, QV requires all additional points to be counted quadratically, meaning points could be assigned as 1 vote = 1 point, 2 votes = 4 points, 3 votes = 9 points, 4 votes= 16 points, 5 votes = 25 points. The operationalization of QV preference will be an 11-point scale with -5 indicating five votes against the policy, 0 indicating no votes on the policy, and 5 indicating five votes in favor of the policy Therefore, a strong preference would cost substantially more points than a weak preference, and the strongest preference of 5 would use all points to just a single policy. Once the Baseline QV was completed, participants are redirected back to Qualtrics for the experimental treatment vignette. The baseline QV can be found at: https://qvsr.io/survey/Zi0w4ogUAYOCLUMEKprN.

3.3 Experimental Treatments
This experiment uses a factorial, cross-cutting design, which are “widely used to study multiple treatments in one experiment” (Muralidharan et al., 2023: 1). The framing and anchoring experimental treatments are a Living Wage and a $18/hour state wage respectively (see Table 1). Experimental treatments will not be mutually exclusive. The four reference and treatment groups are seen in Table 1 & Figure 1, with vignettes in Table 2 and Figure 2. Participants will be evenly distributed to the four groups.

There will be one reference group and three treatment groups. Therefore, the state level alternative wage floor policies are as follows: (1) a $11/hour state minimum wage; (2) a $11/hour state living wage; (3) a $18/hour state minimum wage; and (4) a $18/hour state living wage. The first group will act as a reference group, while the remaining three groups will act as independent treatment groups which are prescribed a treatment frame, anchor or both. Participants will be asked to compare the existing and prescribed alternative policy, answer preference questions.

Overall, this choice experiment design follows the methods used by Elias et al. (2019) and Lennon et al. (2022), through directly asking participants to compare a current and a proposed policy. Our dependent variable, participant preferences for minimum wage and economic redistribution, is rooted this decision analysis between a current policy and a policy proposal. After the choice is presented, the preferences for the competing wage systems will be recorded via binary questions of support for the current policy or proposed policy. This includes asking participants to compare the current federal minimum wage policy to one of the alternative policies regarding support for a state mandated wage floor, expected unemployment effects, and desire for cities to also have their own wage floors. These questions are followed by asking participants to choose their preferred federal and state wage floor. These first five questions permit participants to directly compare both policies, and then we will ask participants to focus on the alternative policy received after reflecting on how it compares to the existing policy.

Next, treatment groups will be asked to imagine one of the alternative policies is enacted (see Figure 1), with the reference group prescribed a regulatory state wage that matches the norm as of 2024 (Department of Labor, 2024). After this policy prescription, participants will be asked additional questions related to economic redistribution and UBI. An attention check question is also asked to ensure compliance and reinforce the monetary figures within the experiment. Once participants have answered questions in Qualtrics, they will be redirected to complete another QV. However, this time participants will be instructed to answer as if the prescribed alternative wage floor system was implemented. Overall, the sliders, numeric-textbox, Likert scale questions and QV should provide robust evidence of the framing and anchoring effects from both the term living wage and a high proposed regulatory wage floor. Please see the following link for an example post treatment QV prescribed to participants: https://qvsr.io/survey/8cCD4ByX07jZ8eWA7p6z.

Design details

Randomization method
Qualtrics employs a function to divide participants to different treatment groups with an equal probability, ensuring fair and equal randomization. An example of the full survey can be found here in the attached Pre-Analysis Plan.
Randomization unit
frames: Living Wage or Minimum Wage anchors: $11/hour or $18/hour
Clusters
We will recruit 2,000 from the general adult US population in using the platform Prolific.
Observations
2,000 observations, with one trial per participant.
Arms
500 Reference ($11/hour minimum wage), 500 Treatment 1 ($11/hour living wage), 500 Treatment 2, ($18/hour minimum wage), 500 Treatment 3 ($18/hour living wage)
Primary outcomes
H1a. A living wage frame will increase support for a state-level regulatory wage floor. H1b. A living wage frame will increase the preferred monetary wage floor preferences, both at the national and state levels. H2a. A $18/hour policy will decrease support for a state-level regulatory wage floor. H2b. A $18/hour policy will increase agreement that the wage floor will lead to unemployment and hurt the economy. H2c. A $18/hour policy will have positive effects on the preferred monetary wage floor preferences, both at the national and state levels.
Secondary outcomes
H1c. A living wage frame will have positive or null effects on support for other redistributive policies, specifically UBI. H2d. A $18/hour policy will decrease UBI support and preferred UBI monthly payments. H2e. A $18/hour policy will decrease support for other redistributive policies.

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Keywords