Revenue Windfalls & Accountability
How to cite
James, Alexander; Murphy, James; Servátka, Maroš. 2024. "Revenue Windfalls & Accountability." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014212. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14212-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Existing literature suggests that taxation is necessary for robust democratic representation. The argument is centered around the idea that money is not fungible. Rather, how money is spent depends on how money is obtained. In the context of public finance, this implies that people's preferences over government expenditures depend on how the public revenue was collected. Revenue generated from a broad-based tax is potentially viewed differently than revenue generated from, say, an intergovernmental grant or resource windfall. We explore this idea using an experiment in which people are assigned the role of either "Governor" or "Citizen". Depending on the treatment, Citizens receive either i) earned income or ii) a windfall. An exogenously determined tax is implemented and the resulting tax revenue is given to the Governor. The tax revenue can be embezzled by a Governor, or invested in a risky asset that pays the Citizen $1.20 with a 5/6 probability and $0 with a 1/6 probability. Modeled as a hidden-action game, should a Citizen receive $0, they do not know if the revenue was embezzled or if the investment paid $0 by chance. We also augment this basic framework with a treatment in which Citizens can punish Governors by reducing their earnings by $0.20. Outcomes of interest include i) the rate at which Governor's embezzle money in windfall and earned-income treatments (in both the "punishment" and "no punishment" treatments), ii) the rate at which Citizens punish Governor's in windfall and earned-income treatments.
Intervention
Subjects in this study will be randomly assigned the role of either "Citizen" or "Governor". Governors will tax either i) earned or ii) windfall income from the Citizen. The Governor can choose to keep the money for themselves or invest in a risky asset. In one branch of the experiment, the Citizen will have the opportunity to punish the Governor by reducing their pay once the Citizen realizes their return. The 2x2 design consists of interventions where i) the Citizen earning their money rather than simply being endowed with it and ii) the Citizen being able to punish the Governor rather than having no matter of recourse.
Experimental design
Subjects will be recruited on Prolific. Subjects in this study will be randomly assigned the role of either "Citizen" or "Governor". Governors will tax either i) earned or ii) windfall income from the Citizen. The tax is automatic and is not a choice. The Governor can choose to keep the money for themselves or invest in a risky asset. In one branch of the experiment, the Citizen will have the opportunity to punish the Governor by reducing their pay once the Citizen realizes their return. The interventions include i) the Citizen earning their money rather than simply being endowed with it and ii) the Citizen being able to punish the Governor rather than having no matter of recourse. The experiment is conducted using the strategy method. Subjects make decisions for all possible scenarios without knowing which one will be chosen by their counterparts. For example, Citizens are asked to choose a punishment should they be matched with a Governor who returns nothing to them and also choose a punishment should they be matched with a Governor who returns a positive amount to them.
Design details
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