Knowledge Hoarding
How to cite
Swanson, Nicholas; Cefala, Luisa; Naso, Pedro; Irakoze, Franck. 2024. "Knowledge Hoarding." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014206. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14206-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The diffusion of new technologies is a crucial driver for growth in low-income countries, especially in the agricultural sector. Motivated by theory, researchers and policymakers have relied on networks as a source of rapid knowledge diffusion, yet often with modest empirical results, suggesting that information transmission is not frictionless. We propose a novel mechanism that might prevent information diffusion: “knowledge hoarding.” In settings where early technology adopters (incumbents) derive rents from it, they might strategically halt its diffusion to preserve the rent their knowledge grants them. This project asks whether knowledge hoarding limit aggregate productivity gains because of distributional consequences generated by knowledge diffusion.
We study this question in the context of modern agricultural technologies in Burundi, where agents already trained in the new technology (incumbents) have a private incentive not to share knowledge in the labor market: they face higher labor demand and a wage premium from mastering the planting technologies. We design two experiments to quantify the effect of knowledge hoarding on knowledge diffusion, and to show the distributional and aggregate consequences of knowledge hoarding on labor market equilibria, technology adoption, and productivity.
Intervention
In this project, we conduct two different sets of experiments that identify different incentives that workers have to “hoard” knowledge from others. We described one set of experiments in a PAP on the AEA called “Knowledge Hoarding”. In this registration we describe the second set of experiments.
In this experiment, we vary both the identity of the individual to be trained, as well as the task (and whether it is perceived as rivalrous or not) to look at under which conditions individuals hoard knowledge.
In this experiment, we measure the effects of hoarding behavior on labor market outcomes. To do this we identify workers in each village who are skilled in row-planting/microdosage, and workers who are unskilled in these techniques. Villages are then assigned to one of four treatment arms:
1) Same village workers, rivalrous task: skilled workers are invited to a training event. At this training event, they are asked to spend the entire day with unskilled workers. At this event, they are told that they can use the time together to do different activies, one of which is teaching the other workers row-planting and fertilizer microdosage. Unskilled workers in this treatment are from the same village (labor market).
2) Same village workers, placebo task: skilled workers are invited to a training event. At this training event, they are asked to spend the entire day with unskilled workers. At this event, they are told that they can use the time together to do different activies, one of which is teaching the other workers a non-rivalrous agricultural task. Unskilled workers in this treatment are from the same village (labor market).
3) Different village workers, rivalrous task: skilled workers are invited to a training event. At this training event, they are asked to spend the entire day with unskilled workers. At this event, they are told that they can use the time together to do different activities, one of which is teaching the other workers row-planting and fertilizer microdosage. Unskilled workers in this treatment are from a different village (labor market).
4) Different village workers, placebo task: skilled workers are invited to a training event. At this training event, they are asked to spend the entire day with unskilled workers. At this event, they are told that they can use the time together to do different activities, one of which is teaching the other workers a non-rivalrous agricultural task. Unskilled workers in this treatment are from a different village (labor market).
Experimental design
We sample in all villages a set of laborers who have skills in row-planting/fertilizer microdosage, as well as a set of unskilled laborers in those tasks.
Skilled workers are invited to a training event. At this training event, they are asked to spend the entire day with unskilled workers. At this event, they are told that they can use the time together to do different activities, where the task is either row-planting and microdosage, or another task, depending on the villages treatment condition. In Same-village treatment arms, unskilled workers in this treatment are from the same village (labor market). In Different-village treatment arms, unskilled workers in this treatment are from another village (labor market). Specifically, we take the same workers that were the same village workers for one task, and then use the same laborers as the laborers to be trained for the other task in the different village treatment.
We then measure the likelihood that the worker is trained (as measured by their skill in the task at the end of the event) as described above.
Design details
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