Gender social norms, expectations, and sanctions: An experimental economics perspective

How to cite

Villegas, Maria. 2025. "Gender social norms, expectations, and sanctions: An experimental economics perspective." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014184. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14184-1.0

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Maria Villegas*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014184
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14184-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2024-06-26 – 2025-03-07
Countries
Mexico (Latin America)
JEL codes
C99, J16
Secondary IDs
CONBIOÉTICA-09-CEl-008-20160601
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14184

Abstract

This study examines gender social norms and their relationship with social sanctions and perceptions of gender equality. Social norms, as informal rules that guide behavior and set expectations based on gender, significantly impact educational, labor, and economic opportunities. These norms dictate appropriate behaviors for men and women, and non-compliance often results in social sanctions, perpetuating gender inequality.

The research adopts an experimental economics approach to explore these dynamics. The primary objectives are: (i) to identify differences in gender social norms across various groups; and (ii) to evaluate the existence and intensity of sanctions against those who deviate from these norms and how the penalization differs according to the sex of the non-conforming person.

The study employs an online experiment, including a Krupka-Weber norm elicitation question regarding time distribution between men and women, a dictator game to assess the level of penalties for non-conformity, and additional questions to reveal participants' views on gender equality.

Intervention

This intervention is designed as an online experiment to explore the penalization related to non-conformity with gender social norms. It is structured around two main parts: (i) an incentivized question tailored to elicit the social norm about the allocation of time between paid and unpaid household work, following the Krupka & Weber (2013) elicitation method; (ii) a Dictator Game where participants decide on the allocation of resources between themselves and a virtual counterpart. The counterpart’s compliance with gender norms regarding time distribution is the manipulated variable. The deviations are varied along two dimensions: the sex of the virtual counterpart (same sex, opposite sex) and the degree of non-compliance (complies with the gender social norm; does not comply with the gender social norm by doing more household work than what the social norm expects; does not comply with the gender social norm by doing less household work than what the social norm expects). This approach allows for the examination of whether deviations from gender norms influence penalizations or rewards, and if these reactions differ based on the sex of the deviator.

Experimental design

In this online experiment, participants are randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions that differ in the compliance with the gender social norm and the sex of the virtual counterpart in a Dictator Game. Participants will first be asked to 'Guess how the majority of people close to you believe household chores should be divided between men and women in a family consisting of a couple and their two young children,' using an incentivized task. This captures the social norm for a specific situation, making the responses comparable.
Participants will then play a dictator game with a virtual counterpart from whom they know only their sex. Finally, participants will play another dictator game with a counterpart from whom they know both their sex and whether they comply with the gender social norm.
The decision problem is embedded in a standard dictator-game setup where the shared amount is our outcome variable. We have the following three experimental cells/treatment arms:
1. The participant decides their strategy considering the sex of the virtual person they are playing with (receiver) and the following information about the degree of conformity with the social norm: the virtual person complies with the gender social norm regarding the distribution of time between paid work and unpaid reproductive or caregiving work.
2. The participant decides their strategy considering the sex of the virtual person they are playing with (receiver) and the following information about the degree of conformity with the social norm: the virtual person does not comply with the gender social norm, as they allocate more hours to paid work and fewer hours to unpaid reproductive or caregiving work compared to what the norm stipulates.
3. The participant decides their strategy considering the sex of the virtual person they are playing with (receiver) and the following information about the degree of conformity with the social norm: the virtual person does not comply with the gender social norm, as they allocate fewer hours to paid work and more hours to unpaid reproductive or caregiving work compared to what the norm stipulates.

Design details

Randomization method
oTree, developed by Chen et al. (2016), was used for the randomization of the treatments.
Randomization unit
Individual (participants).
Clusters
No clusters are planned in this study.
Observations
246 participants.
Arms
41 per treatment arm (3 treatments, between-sex group design).
Primary outcomes
Gender social norm regarding time allocation between paid work and unpaid household work. Sanction or reward for the compliance or no compliance with the elicited social norm.
Sponsors
Name: International Research Centre for Social and Solidarity Economy (CIIESS) Location: Mexico Url: https://ciiess.ibero.mx/ Name: Prof. Isidro Soloaga Location: Mexico Url: https://economia.ibero.mx/personnel/dr-isidro-soloaga/

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Keywords