Signals of Consent
How to cite
Lozano, Lina; Michailidou, Georgia. 2024. "Signals of Consent." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014123. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14123-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Violations of sexual consent are painful for the victims and disturbing for society. While cases of assault and harassment present important variations, a common feature often emerges in courtrooms. A victim and an accused acknowledge that a sexual encounter took place, but they disagree on whether that was mutually consensual. Depending on the jurisdiction, two models are typically applied in rulings over such cases. One is the affirmative consent (“yes means yes”) model, the other is the negative consent (“no means no”) model. The two models overlap in that they both require a conscious expression of a signal; a yes or a no. However, they differ in how they treat the absence of a signal, i.e., in the role they assign to silence. While the affirmative model suggests that silence cannot be an indication of consent, the negative model proposes that silence is not an indication of withdrawn consent. To study the complexities of silence, we construct a theoretical and experimental paradigm where silence exists as a communication strategy between a consent giver and a consent taker. We extend the paradigm to consider environments similar to those produced by the affirmative and negative legal frameworks and we discuss their welfare implications considering consent violations, missed matches, and false accusations.
Experimental design
The study involves an incentivized consent game where individuals express written consent to participate in a pleasant or unpleasant task. Expressing written consent incurs a cost, while remaining silent is cost-free. These tasks, involving viewing images from a validated psychological survey, are designed to evoke emotions similar to those felt when one's consent is regarded or disregarded. Two treatment variations will evaluate consent violations under “yes means yes” (YmY) and “no means no” (NmN) legal models, with outcomes reflected in monetary losses or gains. There are two players, an Underperson and an Overperson, who are randomly matched and given the same initial endowment. The game is one-shot, sequential, and the full set of payoffs is common knowledge. There are two possible states of the world: a pleasant or an unpleasant process for the Underperson. Only the Underperson knows the state, making this an asymmetric information game.
Design details
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