Signals of Consent

How to cite

Lozano, Lina; Michailidou, Georgia. 2024. "Signals of Consent." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014123. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14123-1.0

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Lina Lozano* , Georgia Michailidou

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014123
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14123-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-08-12 – 2024-11-30
Countries
United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14123

Abstract

Violations of sexual consent are painful for the victims and disturbing for society. While cases of assault and harassment present important variations, a common feature often emerges in courtrooms. A victim and an accused acknowledge that a sexual encounter took place, but they disagree on whether that was mutually consensual. Depending on the jurisdiction, two models are typically applied in rulings over such cases. One is the affirmative consent (“yes means yes”) model, the other is the negative consent (“no means no”) model. The two models overlap in that they both require a conscious expression of a signal; a yes or a no. However, they differ in how they treat the absence of a signal, i.e., in the role they assign to silence. While the affirmative model suggests that silence cannot be an indication of consent, the negative model proposes that silence is not an indication of withdrawn consent. To study the complexities of silence, we construct a theoretical and experimental paradigm where silence exists as a communication strategy between a consent giver and a consent taker. We extend the paradigm to consider environments similar to those produced by the affirmative and negative legal frameworks and we discuss their welfare implications considering consent violations, missed matches, and false accusations.

Experimental design

The study involves an incentivized consent game where individuals express written consent to participate in a pleasant or unpleasant task. Expressing written consent incurs a cost, while remaining silent is cost-free. These tasks, involving viewing images from a validated psychological survey, are designed to evoke emotions similar to those felt when one's consent is regarded or disregarded. Two treatment variations will evaluate consent violations under “yes means yes” (YmY) and “no means no” (NmN) legal models, with outcomes reflected in monetary losses or gains. There are two players, an Underperson and an Overperson, who are randomly matched and given the same initial endowment. The game is one-shot, sequential, and the full set of payoffs is common knowledge. There are two possible states of the world: a pleasant or an unpleasant process for the Underperson. Only the Underperson knows the state, making this an asymmetric information game.

Design details

Randomization method
Players are randomly assigned by a computer to the role of either Underperson or Overperson. Within each role, they are further randomly assigned to one of three treatments: Baseline, Yes means Yes (YmY), or No means No (NmN).
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
6000 individuals (3000 Underperson and 3000 Overperson)
Observations
6000 individuals (3000 Underperson and 3000 Overperson)
Arms
3000 Underperson and 3000 Overperson, where 1000 of each role are assigned to one of three treatments: Baseline, Yes means Yes (YmY), or No means No (NmN).
Primary outcomes
Whether people convey consent through explicit signal sending under YmY or NmN, (ii) whether silence is more often used to convey positive consent or negative consent, (iii) the interpretation of silence under each legal framework, (iv) the frequency of mismatches (i.e., cases where an Underperson and an Overperson end up in situations where their individual utilities are not maximized), and (v) how these first three points compare to the Baseline. We also compare the two court legislations by examining (i) the frequency with which the Underperson triggers a court case, (ii) the frequency of mismatches, (iii) the extent of signal violations by the Overperson and the Underperson's truthfulness in signal sending, and (iv) the welfare consequences in terms of monetary gains and losses.
Secondary outcomes
In the survey, we elicit (i) demographics (such as gender, age, race, sexual orientation, and education), and (ii) individuals' perceptions of risk, trust, competitiveness, and social preferences. We will engage in a heterogeneity analysis based on these characteristics. We will also analyze whether behavior in the consent game correlates with individuals' views on dating, sexual, and consenting behaviors. Additionally, we will examine the social appropriateness of real-life sexual consenting situations and explore how these views relate to behavior in the consent game.

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Keywords