Liquidity and incentives for experimentation with agricultural technology
How to cite
Kansikas, Carolina; Tosun, Hasan Alperen. 2024. "Liquidity and incentives for experimentation with agricultural technology." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014041. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14041-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study demand for incentive schemes to foster agricultural technology adoption. In particular, we examine the relevance of asset market liquidity as a barrier for farmers who may be willing to experiment with new technologies (small mechanization assets). We define the liquidity of an asset as its ability to be realized as cash-on-hand. We elicit incentivized willingness to pay for a `buyback guarantee' scheme, the closest policy equivalent to easing the asset market liquidity constraint without affecting alternative channels. We use three types of small machinery (used at different stages of the crop cycle) that have been shown to increase agricultural yields in this context and elicit demand for the `buyback guarantee’.
We first quantify the relevance of this constraint through the willingness to pay exercise (Becker-Degroot-Marshak mechanism) in a method similar to the one in Berry et al (2020). We further try to understand factors that affect valuation from the perspective of environmental variability, uncertainty about assets’ returns, and preferences.
We complement the elicitation with a randomized survey experiment (where liquidity is randomly assigned to an asset) and measurement of perception of asset characteristics (returns, perceived liquidity, prices) for both assets individuals own, and the three investment assets used for the buyback.
Intervention
We conduct a survey among approximately 600 farmers in rural Central Kenya to elicit the following:
(i) Survey to elicit perceptions of liquidity, returns and prices of three small mechanization assets;
(ii) Incentivized willingness to pay for the buyback guarantee;
(iii) Survey experiment with random allocation of liquidity profiles to assets (assignment to equal vs. higher liquidity script).
Experimental design
We use a sample of 600 farmers in rural Central Kenya. We estimate demand (willingness to pay) for a buyback guarantee of a period of six months that would enable farmers to resell a machine the buy to the shop within the guarantee period, for a price accounting for depreciation and determined by a third-party evaluation. We tie the promotion to three types of machinery and elicit willingness to pay for the guarantee based on individuals' preferred machinery. We use a Becker-Degroot-Marshak mechanism to elicit willingness to pay for the buyback guarantee. Incentivization is implemented by offering the buyback promotion through a lottery.
Willingness to pay is elicited as a price in KES but we will use willingness to pay as a share of machinery price for the purpose of analysis.
Design details
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