Liquidity and incentives for experimentation with agricultural technology

How to cite

Kansikas, Carolina; Tosun, Hasan Alperen. 2024. "Liquidity and incentives for experimentation with agricultural technology." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0014041. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14041-1.0

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Carolina Kansikas* , Hasan Alperen Tosun

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0014041
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.14041-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-07-22 – 2026-02-01
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/14041

Abstract

We study demand for incentive schemes to foster agricultural technology adoption. In particular, we examine the relevance of asset market liquidity as a barrier for farmers who may be willing to experiment with new technologies (small mechanization assets). We define the liquidity of an asset as its ability to be realized as cash-on-hand. We elicit incentivized willingness to pay for a `buyback guarantee' scheme, the closest policy equivalent to easing the asset market liquidity constraint without affecting alternative channels. We use three types of small machinery (used at different stages of the crop cycle) that have been shown to increase agricultural yields in this context and elicit demand for the `buyback guarantee’.

We first quantify the relevance of this constraint through the willingness to pay exercise (Becker-Degroot-Marshak mechanism) in a method similar to the one in Berry et al (2020). We further try to understand factors that affect valuation from the perspective of environmental variability, uncertainty about assets’ returns, and preferences.

We complement the elicitation with a randomized survey experiment (where liquidity is randomly assigned to an asset) and measurement of perception of asset characteristics (returns, perceived liquidity, prices) for both assets individuals own, and the three investment assets used for the buyback.

Intervention

We conduct a survey among approximately 600 farmers in rural Central Kenya to elicit the following:
(i) Survey to elicit perceptions of liquidity, returns and prices of three small mechanization assets;
(ii) Incentivized willingness to pay for the buyback guarantee;
(iii) Survey experiment with random allocation of liquidity profiles to assets (assignment to equal vs. higher liquidity script).

Experimental design

We use a sample of 600 farmers in rural Central Kenya. We estimate demand (willingness to pay) for a buyback guarantee of a period of six months that would enable farmers to resell a machine the buy to the shop within the guarantee period, for a price accounting for depreciation and determined by a third-party evaluation. We tie the promotion to three types of machinery and elicit willingness to pay for the guarantee based on individuals' preferred machinery. We use a Becker-Degroot-Marshak mechanism to elicit willingness to pay for the buyback guarantee. Incentivization is implemented by offering the buyback promotion through a lottery.

Willingness to pay is elicited as a price in KES but we will use willingness to pay as a share of machinery price for the purpose of analysis.

Design details

Randomization method
Public lottery for willingness-to-pay elicitation, randomization done in office by a computer for incentive assignment, coin toss for the survey experiment.
Randomization unit
Individual.
Clusters
N/A.
Observations
600 is the target but there may be deviations as enumerators are hired by the day.
Arms
Target is 600, however there may be some deviations from this as enumerators are hired by the day.
Primary outcomes
Willingness to pay for buyback scheme, Perception of asset returns (productivity), prices and liquidity, Allocation of KES in randomized survey experiment. We will investigate the factors leading to higher willingness to pay for buybacks, in particular, exposure to environmental shocks, uncertainty in returns to the machinery, strength of existing resale networks.
Secondary outcomes
Perception of suppliers offering buyback guarantees, Increases in probability of investment in presence of buyback guarantee.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords