Preferences and willingness to pay for climate policy mixes

How to cite

Rütten, Karolina; Kalkuhl, Matthias; Kellner, Maximilian; Peichl, Andreas; Windsteiger, Lisa. 2024. "Preferences and willingness to pay for climate policy mixes." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013909. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13909-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Karolina Rütten* , Matthias Kalkuhl , Maximilian Kellner , Andreas Peichl , Lisa Windsteiger

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013909
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13909-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-07-04 – 2025-07-04
Countries
Private
JEL codes
H21, H23, H53, Q54, Q58
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13909

Abstract

The experiment is designed to analyze the gap between public preferences and economically optimal environmental policy making. We confront respondents with the monetary cost induced by carbon pricing and and an alternative subsidy scheme. Given the low public acceptance of carbon pricing, we investigate whether preferences shift when the cost of subsidizing is made salient. A VAT increase is used to finance subsidy programs of varying efficiencies. If the preference for either instrument changes as costs are made salient, the experiment can provide an estimate of the public's additional willingness to pay for subsidies compared to Pigouvian pricing. The survey is conducted online in Germany and refers to examples from the housing sector to explain the carbon pricing mechanisms and the effect of subsidies.

Intervention

We confront respondents with the monetary cost induced by carbon pricing and an alternative subsidy scheme. Respondents receive information about the inherent cost of subsidies in form of a VAT increase, which are usually not salient in public discussions about subsidy programs. To elicit the willingness to pay for subsidies, respondents are randomly assigned to a subsidy program with a high or low efficiency levels. The low efficiency group faces considerably higher VAT increases.

Experimental design

Information experiment which reveals non-salient policy costs to treated individuals; two levels of policy costs are randomly assigned to two treament groups to calculate Average Treatment Effects

Design details

Randomization method
Computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
Sample size of 3,000 individuals
Observations
Sample size of 3,000 individuals
Arms
1,000 individuals per treatment
Primary outcomes
Share of carbon pricing in Germany's climate policy mix, willingness to support the chosen policy mix in a referendum

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords