Testing of incentive mechanism to foster farmers coordination: a lab-in-the-field in Zimbabwe

How to cite

Belard, Amandine; Jourdain, Damien; Bayle, Gabriel; Farolfi, Stefano; Pedsiza, Tarisai; Ngoma, Hambulo; Gérard, Françoise; Affholder, François. 2024. "Testing of incentive mechanism to foster farmers coordination: a lab-in-the-field in Zimbabwe." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013895. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13895-1.0

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Amandine Belard* , Damien Jourdain , Gabriel Bayle , Stefano Farolfi , Tarisai Pedsiza , Hambulo Ngoma , Françoise Gérard , François Affholder

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013895
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13895-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2024-04-01 – 2024-10-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
Agriculture; Field experiment; Sustainable Development
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13895

Abstract

Transitioning towards a more sustainable agriculture is essential for ensuring future food production (Corbeels et al., 2020; Garnett et al., 2013; Mueller et al., 2012; Pretty et al., 2011). Sustainable cropping systems yield greater benefits when implemented on a larger scale: this necessitates coordination between farmers. Thus, a policy that fosters coordination among farmers can be economically justified, as it is likely to generate more public goods per dollar invested.

This study investigates the effectiveness and efficiency of different incentive mechanisms to promote farmers’ adoption of sustainable cropping systems in Zimbabwe. The analysis considers financial incentives as a potential policy tool to enhance both the adoption and the coordination among farmers. These mechanisms are tested in a lab-in-the-field setting in rural Zimbabwe with smallholder farmers.

Our research explores the effectiveness of two types of financial incentives: individual-based and collective-based incentives. The individual incentive offers subsidies based on the farmer individual level of adoption. In contrast, the collective incentive is contingent upon broader community participation; a subsidy is granted only if at least 50% of a community's plots are managed under sustainable agriculture. This structure aims to encourage community-wide coordination by linking immediate and concrete benefits to collective action. Our lab-in-the-field experiments provide insights into how these incentives influence farmers' decisions. The study aims to evaluate which incentive structure more effectively promotes the adoption of sustainable cropping systems. The results will contribute to a broader understanding of policy mechanisms that can support the transition towards environmentally sustainable and economically viable agricultural systems in resource-constrained settings.

References

Corbeels, M., Naudin, K., Whitbread, A. M., Kühne, R., & Letourmy, P. (2020). Limits of conservation agriculture to overcome low crop yields in sub-Saharan Africa. Nature Food, 1(7), 447-454. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-020-0114-x

Cox, J. C. (2004). How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 46(2), 260-281. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00119-2

Crosetto, P., & Filippin, A. (2013). The "bomb" risk elicitation task. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 47(1), 31-65. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43550175

Garnett, T., Appleby, M. C., Balmford, A., Bateman, I. J., Benton, T. G., Bloomer, P., Burlingame, B., Dawkins, M., Dolan, L., Fraser, D., Herrero, M., Hoffmann, I., Smith, P., Thornton, P. K., Toulmin, C., Vermeulen, S. J., & Godfray, H. C. J. (2013). Sustainable intensification in agriculture: Premises and policies [Short survey]. Science, 341(6141), 33-34. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1234485

Midler, E., Pascual, U., Drucker, A. G., Narloch, U., & Soto, J. L. (2015). Unraveling the effects of payments for ecosystem services on motivations for collective action. Ecological Economics, 120, 394-405. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.04.006

Mueller, N. D., Gerber, J. S., Johnston, M., Ray, D. K., Ramankutty, N., & Foley, J. A. (2012). Closing yield gaps through nutrient and water management. Nature, 490(7419), 254-257. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature11420

Pretty, J., Toulmin, C., & Williams, S. (2011). Sustainable intensification in African agriculture. International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability, 9(1), 5-24. https://doi.org/10.3763/ijas.2010.0583

Intervention

1. Testing the incentive mechanism

We use an adapted version of Midler et al. (2015). A framed public good game with threshold is presented to farmers. Players are given four plots and grouped with three other players. Players must choose a cropping system between A and B. The contribution to the public good (PG) occurs when players allocate their plots to cropping system B. The individual per capita return for cropping system B is lower than for A. If 50% of the group’s plots are allocated to cropping system B, the threshold is reached and players have returns proportional to the total group contribution.

Baseline settings (T0): framed public good game with threshold, no incentives

Treatment 1 (T1): baseline settings + individual incentive
Players receive a bonus proportional to their contribution to the PG

Treatment 2 (T2): baseline settings + collective incentive
Players receive a bonus if the threshold is reached and proportional to the group’s contribution to the PG

Treatment 3 (T3): baseline settings + individual incentive + collective incentive
Combination of both treatment 1 and 2

Treatment 4 (T4): treatment 3 settings but the game is not framed in terms of “bonus”, essentially, the baseline settings with different parameters. This treatment is specifically designed to examine the impact of framing on players' decisions.

The game is repeated over 8 rounds. Group members are anonymous and randomly selected at the beginning of the game. Groups stay the same for the 8 rounds.

H1 – In the absence of incentives, players will play according to the Nash equilibrium, meaning they will not contribute to the PG.

H2 – The introduction of incentives leads to increased contributions to the public good, with player behavior aligning more closely with the coordination Nash Equilibrium .

H3 – Both individual and collective incentives are equally effective in motivating players to contribute to the public good.

H4 – The combination of individual and collective incentives results in an additive effect, further increasing contributions to the public good compared to when these incentives are applied separately.

H5 - Players will contribute more to the public good only when they are aware of the incentive (positive effect of framing on contributions).

2. Measuring trust and altruism

We implement the games developed by Cox (2004) which allows disentangle trust and altruism.

3. To measure risk attitude (BRET game)

To measure risk attitude we use a pen and paper version of the “bomb” elicitation task (Crosetto & Filippin, 2013).

4. Questionnaire

Following the three incentivized games, participants complete self-reported measures of trust and a socio-demographic questionnaire.

Experimental design

Between design. Each experimental session is randomly assigned a treatment.
Experimental sessions are to take place in rural Zimbabwe with smallholder farmers

Design details

Randomization method
Treatment assignment at session level using Excel.
Randomization unit
Experimental session
Clusters
30 villages
Observations
1200
Arms
240
Primary outcomes
Individual and group contribution to the PGG
Secondary outcomes
Risk measure from BRET game Altruism, trust and trustworthiness measures

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Keywords