Decision-making under risk and uncertainty
How to cite
Sarwar, Rubayat; Bayer, Ralph-Christopher. 2024. "Decision-making under risk and uncertainty." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013852. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13852-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The study hypothesizes that individuals exposed to innovatively designed risky-investment products will invest significantly higher stakes than those exposed to simpler risky-investment products. Therefore, in this study, we explore why people are attracted to risky investments, such as investment projects consisting of multiple sub-projects. We will examine whether misjudging probability of success and being attracted to innovative risks cause people to overspend on these investment products in a series of controlled economic experiments.
Experimental design
To investigate the underlying behavioral mechanisms driving people towards innovative risky investment products, we will conduct controlled economic experiments in a laboratory. There will be three groups of participants, corresponding to three different treatments. We will test how investment decisions differ among these groups. Each participant will play a set of ten investment project games, which are identical across the three treatments; i.e., projects will have identical probabilities and identical payouts. Identical projects across the three groups will help control the factors that could otherwise influence investment decisions. The only difference among these treatments will be how the projects are presented.
For each project, participants will be given a virtual endowment of 8 dollars in the programmed experiment in Z-tree, from which they can allocate their stakes between 0 and 8 dollars for the investments. The difference between their endowment and the amount invested will be part of their profit from the investment. The other part will be the return on the investment, received only if it is successful.
In Treatment 1, projects will be presented as investment projects consisting of multiple sub-projects, without compound probability of success information. We will provide probability information for each sub-project to the participants but will not tell them the compound probability of success for all sub-projects in an investment project. However, participants will be provided with a profit calculator on the game screen, which will be optional to use. They may or may not use it to calculate the expected income from any investment value in case of both successful and unsuccessful outcomes. Using intuition, participants will decide on the optimal level of investment.
In Treatment 2, the same investment projects consisting of multiple sub-projects will be offered, but with compound probability information.
In Treatment 3, the same projects will be offered in the form of single investment projects. All three treatments will present the payout from each unit of investment stake explicitly. In our experiment, as the games are objective, the value of probability information given in the experiment is free from human judgment. Each participant will undergo only one of these three treatments, making this experiment a cross-subject design.
Design details
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