The effects of upfront payments as a de-risking tool on follow-up investments

How to cite

Hmaddi, Ouafaa; Lall, Saurabh; Chen, Wendy. 2024. "The effects of upfront payments as a de-risking tool on follow-up investments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013811. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13811-1.1

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Ouafaa Hmaddi* , Saurabh Lall , Wendy Chen

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013811
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13811-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2024-07-01 – 2024-08-08
Countries
United Arab Emirates (), Argentina (), Bangladesh (), Belgium (), Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (), Canada (), Switzerland (), Chile (), Colombia (), Germany (), Denmark (), Ecuador (), Spain (), France (), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (), Georgia (), Guatemala (), India (), Japan (), Kenya (), Kosovo (), Myanmar (), Mauritius (), Mexico (), Nigeria (), Netherlands (), Peru (), Philippines (), Portugal (), Rwanda (), Singapore (), Somalia (), Suriname (), Thailand (), Tanzania, United Republic of (), United States of America (), Viet Nam (), South Africa ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13811

Abstract

This study investigates whether upfront payments provided to impact enterprises in Social Impact Incentives (SIINC) transactions serve as a de-risking tool for investors, thereby increasing their likelihood of investment. Using a deductive approach, the research design incorporates stratification of investors based on key criteria: Type of Investor, Investment Thesis, and Average Investment Ticket Size. Two balanced cohort samples, Cohort 1 (control) and Cohort 2 (treatment), are randomly assigned to receive either the standard SIINC without upfront payments (Start-up A) or a SIINC with a 20% upfront payment (Start-up B). The hypothesis posits that the inclusion of upfront payments in SIINC transactions will enhance investors' propensity to conduct due diligence and pursue investment opportunities by 25%, effectively serving as a de-risking mechanism.

Investors are asked whether they would engage in due diligence for potential investment and to rate the influence of the SIINC contract on their decision. Stratified investor segments include commercial venture capitalists, and impact investors, considering their varying degrees of impact orientation and risk perception.

The findings are anticipated to reveal a significant increase in investment likelihood for Start-up B, especially among impact-oriented investors and those with investment theses aligned with health tech. This study aims to provide insights into how upfront payments in SIINC transactions can strategically reduce investment risk, thereby facilitating greater investment in early-stage impact enterprises. The results are expected to have significant implications for the design of SIINC transactions and the broader field of impact investing.

Experimental design

Randomly (stratified) assign one of two startups based on the SIINC investment they received to investors.

Design details

Randomization method
Stata randomization. Log file is uploaded
Randomization unit
investor
Clusters
About 120
Observations
About 120
Arms
120
Primary outcomes
Likelihood to initiate due diligence Whether investors need to learn more information about the startup Likelihood to ask for a follow up meeting Likelihood to recommend the opportunity to other investors Likelihood to ask to see the business plan
Secondary outcomes
Potential mechanisms: fit with investment thesis; SIINC upfront investment; fit within ticket size; revenue model and market attraction Other potential mechanisms might be deducted from baseline data

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords