Competitiveness, Affirmative Action and Taxes
How to cite
Freer, Mikhail; Weidenholzer, Simon; Weidenholzer, Elke. 2024. "Competitiveness, Affirmative Action and Taxes." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013800. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13800-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
We propose a lab-experiment to study the role of affirmative action and taxation on the competitiveness of individuals. In this experiment we will exogenously introduce variation in the productivity of subjects. Subjects will perform a routine task under various compensation schemes including piece rate, tournament conditions, tournament conditions with affirmative action and tournament conditions with redistributive taxation. After having gained experience under these schemes, subject will be asked to choose between a given pair of schemes. We are interested in the choice in these binary decisions and in the productivity of subjects across schemes as well as how these choices depend on individual attributes.
Intervention
There are three treatment dimensions:
Difficulty level (between subjects): easy vs difficult
Compensation scheme (within subjects): i) piece rate ii) tournament iii) tournament with affirmative action iv) tournament with taxation
Binary choice between compensation scheme (between subjects): i) piece rate vs pure tournament ii) piece rate vs tournament with affirmative action iii) piece rate vs tournament with taxation iv) pure tournament vs tournament with affirmative action iv) pure tournament vs tournament with taxation
Experimental design
We propose a lab-experiment to study the role of affirmative action and taxation on the competitiveness of individuals. Under a series of compensation schemes our subjects will have to find zeros in a series of matrices of zeros and ones. There are two different difficulty levels, easy (10x10 matrices) and difficult (large 10x15 matrices). Before the start of the actual treatment, all subjects have to perform 2 minutes of practice under both difficulty conditions. We will then randomly introduce variation in the productivity of our subjects. Half of the participants will solve the task under easy conditions and the other half under difficult conditions. Subjects will be informed about their difficulty condition and this assignment will remain constant for a given subject throughout the experiment.
In the actual experiment, all of our subjects will first encounter their assigned task under four different compensation schemes for 5 minutes and we will measure productivity (number of matrices correctly solved). We will randomize the order of these four compensation schemes (within subject). The compensation schemes we study encompass:
i) piece rate incentives,
ii) tournament incentives where two subjects with easy and two subjects with difficult tasks compete and only the two winners get paid (and subjects are aware of the group composition)
iii) tournament incentives (see ii) with affirmative action where those with the difficult task are given a compensatory boost
iv) tournament incentives (see ii) with taxation where the winners are taxed and the proceeds are redistributed.
After subjects have completed the four tasks, they each face a binary choice between two compensation schemes and complete the task under the chosen scheme in the fifth and final round. Our main treatment dimension (between subjects) is the binary choice subjects are given in the last round and consist of:
i) piece rate vs pure tournament
ii) piece rate vs tournament with affirmative action
iii) piece rate vs tournament with taxation
iv) pure tournament vs tournament with affirmative action
v) pure tournament vs tournament with taxation
Additionally, we will collect information on demographics (gender, age, etc) and use a survey to elicit preferences (risk, social, competitiveness, etc) and beliefs on their performance in the tournament conditions.
Of primary interest will be how discriminated and non-discriminated subjects decide in these binary choices and how productivity varies among different compensation schemes. Further, we are interested how these choices are related to individual characteristics (gender, age etc) and survey elicited measures of preferences (risk, competitiveness, over-confidence etc).
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.