Do Contract Remedies Affect Efficient Renegotiation? An Experiment

How to cite

Bortolotti, Stefania; Bigoni, Maria; Zhang, Xin; Parisi, Francesco. 2024. "Do Contract Remedies Affect Efficient Renegotiation? An Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013798. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13798-1.1

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Stefania Bortolotti* , Maria Bigoni , Xin Zhang , Francesco Parisi

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013798
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13798-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2024-06-05 – 2024-06-30
Countries
Italy ()
JEL codes
K12, D86, C9
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13798

Abstract

Rational parties enter into a contract if the agreement is mutually beneficial. However, after the contract is formed, changes to the costs and/or benefits of performance may render the original contract undesirable. In this paper, we carry out an incentivized experiment to study the effect of alternative remedies on the parties’ ability to renegotiate their contractual obligations. After entering into a contract, experimental subjects observe symmetrical changes to the original costs and/or benefits, which create a misalignment of their performance vs. breach incentives. Renegotiation of the original contract would allow parties to realign their interests and to capture some additional surplus. Our experimental design allows us to compare the effects of damage and specific performance remedies on the parties’ ability to renegotiate. Our results provide novel insights for the choice of contract remedies in the face of possible market shocks.

Experimental design

The experiment comprises two parts. In part 1, we consider a modified version of the “Contract-Breach Game” introduced by Bigoni et al. (2017), where a market shock may occur after the parties agreed to sign a binding contract. After learning about the occurrence of a shock, parties can decide to renegotiate the contractual terms under alternative breach remedies. The key, novel aspect of our design is the comparison between two breach remedies, which allows us to compare a damages remedy (Damage treatment) versus a specific performance remedy (Specific Performance treatment). This modified “Contract-Breach Game” à la Bigoni et al. (2017) allows us to study how frequently an efficient agreement to breach is reached under specific performance, and how frequently an efficient agreement to perform the contract is reached under damages. Furthermore, this game allows us to analyze whether the compensation paid by the promisor to the promisee differ between alternative breach remedies, and between alternative reasons to breach. In part 2, all participants take part in a Dictator Game.

Design details

Randomization method
Done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Randomization unit: experimental sessions
Clusters
48 6-person matching groups
Observations
288 experimental subjects
Arms
144 experimental subjects (24 6-person matching groups) per treatment arm
Primary outcomes
Share of pairs who do not enter the renegotiation phase; Share of pairs who are unable to reach an agreement during the renegotiation; Division of the surplus after the shock.

Papers from this trial

  1. Bigoni, M., Bortolotti, S., Parisi, F., Zhang, X. (2024). Do Contract Remedies Affect Efficient Renegotiation? An Experiment. IZA Discussion Paper 17220. https://docs.iza.org/dp17220.pdf

Cited by

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Keywords