Do Contract Remedies Affect Efficient Renegotiation? An Experiment
How to cite
Bortolotti, Stefania; Bigoni, Maria; Zhang, Xin; Parisi, Francesco. 2024. "Do Contract Remedies Affect Efficient Renegotiation? An Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013798. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13798-1.1
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Rational parties enter into a contract if the agreement is mutually beneficial. However, after the contract is formed, changes to the costs and/or benefits of performance may render the original contract undesirable. In this paper, we carry out an incentivized experiment to study the effect of alternative remedies on the parties’ ability to renegotiate their contractual obligations. After entering into a contract, experimental subjects observe symmetrical changes to the original costs and/or benefits, which create a misalignment of their performance vs. breach incentives. Renegotiation of the original contract would allow parties to realign their interests and to capture some additional surplus. Our experimental design allows us to compare the effects of damage and specific performance remedies on the parties’ ability to renegotiate. Our results provide novel insights for the choice of contract remedies in the face of possible market shocks.
Experimental design
The experiment comprises two parts. In part 1, we consider a modified version of the “Contract-Breach Game” introduced by Bigoni et al. (2017), where a market shock may occur after the parties agreed to sign a binding contract. After learning about the occurrence of a shock, parties can decide to renegotiate the contractual terms under alternative breach remedies. The key, novel aspect of our design is the comparison between two breach remedies, which allows us to compare a damages remedy (Damage treatment) versus a specific performance remedy (Specific Performance treatment). This modified “Contract-Breach Game” à la Bigoni et al. (2017) allows us to study how frequently an efficient agreement to breach is reached under specific performance, and how frequently an efficient agreement to perform the contract is reached under damages. Furthermore, this game allows us to analyze whether the compensation paid by the promisor to the promisee differ between alternative breach remedies, and between alternative reasons to breach. In part 2, all participants take part in a Dictator Game.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Bigoni, M., Bortolotti, S., Parisi, F., Zhang, X. (2024). Do Contract Remedies Affect Efficient Renegotiation? An Experiment. IZA Discussion Paper 17220. https://docs.iza.org/dp17220.pdf
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.