Seeds of (climate) change: Private adaptation and subsidized insurance in West Bengal
How to cite
Kelley, Erin; Burlig, Fiona; Lane, Gregory; Dar, Manzoor; Gine, Xavi. 2024. "Seeds of (climate) change: Private adaptation and subsidized insurance in West Bengal." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013781. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13781-1.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Adaptation is required to cope with climate change. Theory predicts that agricultural
insurance, which protects farmers against climate damages, and enjoys billions of sub-
sidy dollars, may either increase or decrease private adaptation. Subsidized insurance
may crowd in adaptation by limiting farmers’ risks from experimenting with new tech-
nologies. However, it may instead crowd out adaptation, by insulating farmers against
climate risk. We test which of these effects dominates with an RCT in West Bengal,
India. We randomize 300 villages into a control group and index insurance arms, where
farmers receive payouts if floods occur. We estimate the impact of insurance on farmer
willingness-to-pay for both flood-tolerant and high-yield-variety seeds, providing a di-
rect test of the impacts of insurance on demand for adaptation. We also induce random
variation in seed take-up, in order to estimate the effects of specialty seeds, insurance,
and their interaction on agricultural inputs and ex post welfare outcomes
Intervention
We use a simple model of decision-making under risk to investigate how subsidized in-
surance impacts the demand for private climate adaptation. Under actuarily fair insurance
pricing, and absent other market failures, farmers would choose the private (and also socially)
optimal level of investment in both insurance and other adaptation technologies. However,
we can then show that subsidized insurance has two counterveiling effects on adaptation
investment, in the spirit of Ehrlich and Becker (1972). On one hand, because climate in-
surance and private climate adaptation both protect agents against the same risks, subsidies
that lower the price of insurance may lead to a “crowd-out” effect. On the other hand,
because climate insurance protects agents from facing the full brunt of the bad state of the
world if a costly adaptation measure fails, these subsidies may instead lead to a “crowd-in”
effect. Which of these effects ultimately dominates is ambiguous.
We set up and implement a sharp empirical test of the impacts of subsidized flood in-
surance on demand for one particular technology – flood-tolerant seeds – in order to shed
important light on the effect of these subsidies more broadly. We take the predictions of the
model to data by implementing a cluster-randomized trial in 300 villages in West Bengal
in conjunction with the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT), a well-respected international organization known for developing advanced crop
varieties. We randomize villages into three groups (sampling 6 farmers per village): a control
group; a group that receives a fully-subsidized index insurance product that pays out a low
amount in the event of a flood; and a group that receives a fully-subsidized index insurance
product that pays out a high amount in the event of a flood. After offering (treated) farmers
the insurance product, we elicit every sampled farmers’ willingness-to-pay for both a flood-
tolerant seed minikit and a high-yield-variety seed minikit using a Becker, DeGroot, and
Marschak (1964) mechanism. We test for crowd-in vs. crowd-out by estimating the impact
of insurance on demand for flood-tolerant seeds, high-yield-variety seeds, and the difference
between the two. We further measure the extent to which these impacts vary with insurance
payout levels.
In addition, through the BDM process, we induce experimental variation in seed take-
up: in each village, at random, one farmer will be offered the high-yield-variety minikit
for the market price and one farmer will be offered the flood-tolerant seed minikit for the
market price (together making up the “seed control group”); two farmers will receive the
high-yield-variety seed minikit for free; and two farmers will receive the flood-tolerant seed
minikit for free. This design enables us to also study how specialty seeds, insurance, and
their interaction impact ex ante agricultural input decisions and ex post welfare outcomes.
Finally, we test how these impacts change with flood realizations.
Experimental design
We use a simple model of decision-making under risk to investigate how subsidized in-
surance impacts the demand for private climate adaptation. Under actuarily fair insurance
pricing, and absent other market failures, farmers would choose the private (and also socially)
optimal level of investment in both insurance and other adaptation technologies. However,
we can then show that subsidized insurance has two counterveiling effects on adaptation
investment, in the spirit of Ehrlich and Becker (1972). On one hand, because climate in-
surance and private climate adaptation both protect agents against the same risks, subsidies
that lower the price of insurance may lead to a “crowd-out” effect. On the other hand,
because climate insurance protects agents from facing the full brunt of the bad state of the
world if a costly adaptation measure fails, these subsidies may instead lead to a “crowd-in”
effect. Which of these effects ultimately dominates is ambiguous.
We set up and implement a sharp empirical test of the impacts of subsidized flood in-
surance on demand for one particular technology – flood-tolerant seeds – in order to shed
important light on the effect of these subsidies more broadly. We take the predictions of the
model to data by implementing a cluster-randomized trial in 300 villages in West Bengal
in conjunction with the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT), a well-respected international organization known for developing advanced crop
varieties. We randomize villages into three groups (sampling 6 farmers per village): a control
group; a group that receives a fully-subsidized index insurance product that pays out a low
amount in the event of a flood; and a group that receives a fully-subsidized index insurance
product that pays out a high amount in the event of a flood. After offering (treated) farmers
the insurance product, we elicit every sampled farmers’ willingness-to-pay for both a flood-
tolerant seed minikit and a high-yield-variety seed minikit using a Becker, DeGroot, and
Marschak (1964) mechanism. We test for crowd-in vs. crowd-out by estimating the impact
of insurance on demand for flood-tolerant seeds, high-yield-variety seeds, and the difference
between the two. We further measure the extent to which these impacts vary with insurance
payout levels.
In addition, through the BDM process, we induce experimental variation in seed take-
up: in each village, at random, one farmer will be offered the high-yield-variety minikit
for the market price and one farmer will be offered the flood-tolerant seed minikit for the
market price (together making up the “seed control group”); two farmers will receive the
high-yield-variety seed minikit for free; and two farmers will receive the flood-tolerant seed
minikit for free. This design enables us to also study how specialty seeds, insurance, and
their interaction impact ex ante agricultural input decisions and ex post welfare outcomes.
Finally, we test how these impacts change with flood realizations.
Design details
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