Seeds of (climate) change: Private adaptation and subsidized insurance in West Bengal

How to cite

Kelley, Erin; Burlig, Fiona; Lane, Gregory; Dar, Manzoor; Gine, Xavi. 2024. "Seeds of (climate) change: Private adaptation and subsidized insurance in West Bengal." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013781. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13781-1.2

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Erin Kelley* , Fiona Burlig , Gregory Lane , Manzoor Dar , Xavi Gine

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013781
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13781-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2024-06-06 – 2025-02-28
Countries
India (West Bengal)
JEL codes
D81; D25; O12; O13; Q12; Q54
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13781

Abstract

Adaptation is required to cope with climate change. Theory predicts that agricultural
insurance, which protects farmers against climate damages, and enjoys billions of sub-
sidy dollars, may either increase or decrease private adaptation. Subsidized insurance
may crowd in adaptation by limiting farmers’ risks from experimenting with new tech-
nologies. However, it may instead crowd out adaptation, by insulating farmers against
climate risk. We test which of these effects dominates with an RCT in West Bengal,
India. We randomize 300 villages into a control group and index insurance arms, where
farmers receive payouts if floods occur. We estimate the impact of insurance on farmer
willingness-to-pay for both flood-tolerant and high-yield-variety seeds, providing a di-
rect test of the impacts of insurance on demand for adaptation. We also induce random
variation in seed take-up, in order to estimate the effects of specialty seeds, insurance,
and their interaction on agricultural inputs and ex post welfare outcomes

Intervention

We use a simple model of decision-making under risk to investigate how subsidized in-
surance impacts the demand for private climate adaptation. Under actuarily fair insurance
pricing, and absent other market failures, farmers would choose the private (and also socially)
optimal level of investment in both insurance and other adaptation technologies. However,
we can then show that subsidized insurance has two counterveiling effects on adaptation
investment, in the spirit of Ehrlich and Becker (1972). On one hand, because climate in-
surance and private climate adaptation both protect agents against the same risks, subsidies
that lower the price of insurance may lead to a “crowd-out” effect. On the other hand,
because climate insurance protects agents from facing the full brunt of the bad state of the
world if a costly adaptation measure fails, these subsidies may instead lead to a “crowd-in”
effect. Which of these effects ultimately dominates is ambiguous.

We set up and implement a sharp empirical test of the impacts of subsidized flood in-
surance on demand for one particular technology – flood-tolerant seeds – in order to shed
important light on the effect of these subsidies more broadly. We take the predictions of the
model to data by implementing a cluster-randomized trial in 300 villages in West Bengal
in conjunction with the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT), a well-respected international organization known for developing advanced crop
varieties. We randomize villages into three groups (sampling 6 farmers per village): a control
group; a group that receives a fully-subsidized index insurance product that pays out a low
amount in the event of a flood; and a group that receives a fully-subsidized index insurance
product that pays out a high amount in the event of a flood. After offering (treated) farmers
the insurance product, we elicit every sampled farmers’ willingness-to-pay for both a flood-
tolerant seed minikit and a high-yield-variety seed minikit using a Becker, DeGroot, and
Marschak (1964) mechanism. We test for crowd-in vs. crowd-out by estimating the impact
of insurance on demand for flood-tolerant seeds, high-yield-variety seeds, and the difference
between the two. We further measure the extent to which these impacts vary with insurance
payout levels.

In addition, through the BDM process, we induce experimental variation in seed take-
up: in each village, at random, one farmer will be offered the high-yield-variety minikit
for the market price and one farmer will be offered the flood-tolerant seed minikit for the
market price (together making up the “seed control group”); two farmers will receive the
high-yield-variety seed minikit for free; and two farmers will receive the flood-tolerant seed
minikit for free. This design enables us to also study how specialty seeds, insurance, and
their interaction impact ex ante agricultural input decisions and ex post welfare outcomes.
Finally, we test how these impacts change with flood realizations.

Experimental design

We use a simple model of decision-making under risk to investigate how subsidized in-
surance impacts the demand for private climate adaptation. Under actuarily fair insurance
pricing, and absent other market failures, farmers would choose the private (and also socially)
optimal level of investment in both insurance and other adaptation technologies. However,
we can then show that subsidized insurance has two counterveiling effects on adaptation
investment, in the spirit of Ehrlich and Becker (1972). On one hand, because climate in-
surance and private climate adaptation both protect agents against the same risks, subsidies
that lower the price of insurance may lead to a “crowd-out” effect. On the other hand,
because climate insurance protects agents from facing the full brunt of the bad state of the
world if a costly adaptation measure fails, these subsidies may instead lead to a “crowd-in”
effect. Which of these effects ultimately dominates is ambiguous.

We set up and implement a sharp empirical test of the impacts of subsidized flood in-
surance on demand for one particular technology – flood-tolerant seeds – in order to shed
important light on the effect of these subsidies more broadly. We take the predictions of the
model to data by implementing a cluster-randomized trial in 300 villages in West Bengal
in conjunction with the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT), a well-respected international organization known for developing advanced crop
varieties. We randomize villages into three groups (sampling 6 farmers per village): a control
group; a group that receives a fully-subsidized index insurance product that pays out a low
amount in the event of a flood; and a group that receives a fully-subsidized index insurance
product that pays out a high amount in the event of a flood. After offering (treated) farmers
the insurance product, we elicit every sampled farmers’ willingness-to-pay for both a flood-
tolerant seed minikit and a high-yield-variety seed minikit using a Becker, DeGroot, and
Marschak (1964) mechanism. We test for crowd-in vs. crowd-out by estimating the impact
of insurance on demand for flood-tolerant seeds, high-yield-variety seeds, and the difference
between the two. We further measure the extent to which these impacts vary with insurance
payout levels.

In addition, through the BDM process, we induce experimental variation in seed take-
up: in each village, at random, one farmer will be offered the high-yield-variety minikit
for the market price and one farmer will be offered the flood-tolerant seed minikit for the
market price (together making up the “seed control group”); two farmers will receive the
high-yield-variety seed minikit for free; and two farmers will receive the flood-tolerant seed
minikit for free. This design enables us to also study how specialty seeds, insurance, and
their interaction impact ex ante agricultural input decisions and ex post welfare outcomes.
Finally, we test how these impacts change with flood realizations.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization
Randomization unit
Village and Household
Clusters
We randomize in two steps. First, we randomly assign each of our 300 villages into an insurance control group (125 villages who receive no insurance product); a high-payout insurance group (125 villages); and a low-payout insurance group (50 villages). We sample six farming households per village. We exclude households that did not cultivate any rice in the last 3 years, since our research design is focused on improved rice seeds. Every sample household in a given village will receive the same insurance treatment. To ensure balance and increase statistical power, we stratify our village-level randomization by block. Second, we randomize individuals to receive offers to purchase either a flood-tolerant seed minikit or a high-yield-variety seed minikit at either market price or for free. This randomization yields four groups: market-price flood-tolerant seed offer (1/6 of households); free flood-tolerant seed offer (1/3 of households); market-price high-yield-variety seed offer (1/6 of households); and free high-yield-variety seed offer (1/3 of households). Because these seeds are already available outside of the experiment, we treat the market price groups as a ``seed control'' group, which we pool for the purposes of analysis. In this second step, we stratify the randomization by village.
Observations
1800
Arms
See above
Primary outcomes
We will conduct baseline surveys in early June 2024, before planting has begun. During this survey, we collect information about households’ demographics, past farming behavior, flood exposure, risk preferences, consumption, assets and loans, and off-farm work. As part of the baseline survey, we also provide households with their insurance offer (if applicable), and elicit willingness-to- pay (WTP) for flood-tolerant and high-yield-variety seeds. Farmers who purchase the seeds through the WTP elicitation game will receive their seed kits once the survey is completed. Applicable insurance payouts will occur in November, and our endline survey will take place after harvest, in November - December 2024. Our endline we measure ex post agricultural outcomes. In particular, for each plot, we ask how much of each crop they harvested. We then ask the amount of the harvested crop that is sold, consumed, spoiled, and slated for future sale.

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Keywords