In this experiment, we examine whether the acceptability of exploiting a tax loophole depends on how “clever” it is. The experiment involves two types of participants: taxpayers and spectators. Taxpayers are matched into groups of three and are supposed to pay a tax designed to equalize their incomes. However, they have the option to engage in a calculation task to reduce their tax rate at the expense of other participants. After the calculation task they have to report the number of correct calculations. Depending on the treatment, the calculation task contains different loopholes, which allows taxpayers to strongly lower their tax rate. Spectators judge whether exploiting the respective loophole is appropriate or not. They can decide whether to sanction workers who exploited the loophole.
This experiment relates to experiment AEARCTR-0011828 (https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11828). In contrast, we manipulate the cleverness of the loophole in this experiment.
Intervention
2 treatments: Baseline, Non-Clever
In Baseline, the loophole is clever and difficult to detect. In Non-Clever, the loophole is not clever and easy to detect.
Experimental design
Spectator-worker design with randomized interventions
Design details
Randomization method
Computerized randomization using Qualtrics. We use the option “evenly present elements.”
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
Target sample: 230 to 280 spectators per treatment conditional on the ability to fill our quotas (see experimental design).
Observations
See above
Arms
See above
Primary outcomes
Share of spectators that sanction loophole exploiters: Spectators are matched with a group of taxpayers from a previous session and can decide whether loophole exploiters should be sanctioned.
Appropriateness of using the loophole: Spectators’ first-order and second-order beliefs of the appropriateness of exploiting the loophole.
Secondary outcomes
As manipulation checks, we estimate treatment effects on agreement with the statements relating to the cleverness of using the loophole, whether they successfully detected the loophole and their guess of how many others detected it.
We will investigate mechanisms explaining the decision to close or sanction the loophole using the factors above, as well as the belief of how many subjects exploit the loophole and by how much.
Exploratively, we will investigate whether behavior in the experiment is correlated with political views and voting behavior in previous presidential elections. We will also investigate the relationship with their beliefs regarding the appropriateness of loopholes, preferences for redistribution, and perceptions of the efficiency of public spending.
Exploratively, we will also investigate the behavior of the taxpayers. Here, we focus on their choice to use the loophole and on whether they consider using the loophole appropriate.
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