Leadership in Dishonesty - Theory and Experiment

How to cite

Schilling, Thomas; Feess, Eberhard; Kerzenmacher, Florian. 2024. "Leadership in Dishonesty - Theory and Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013739. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13739-1.0

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Thomas Schilling* , Eberhard Feess , Florian Kerzenmacher

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013739
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13739-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-06-10 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13739

Abstract

We develop a behavioral game theoretical model to analyze the impact of self-selection in a sequential game where the participants can lie about the outcome of a binary lottery. The participants are paired in groups of two, and both members of the group observe the same outcome of the lottery. The outcome of the lottery is either low or high. Regardless of the outcome of the lottery, both group members receive the high outcome if and only if both of them report HIGH. The two members report sequentially, and the second mover (SM) observers the report of the first mover (FM) before making their report. In our model, we assume that participants care about their own monetary payoff and face type-specific lying costs which are private information.
In our model, we consider two settings that we refer to as EXOGENOUS and ENDOGENOUS. In EXOGENOUS, each group member is assigned to the role of the FM with 50% probability. Our model predicts that (i) the members of the group report HIGH in case of a low outcome if and only if their lying costs are below a certain threshold, and (ii) that the threshold is higher for SMs, i.e. that, for any given distribution of lying costs, the lying probability of SMs after HIGH by FMs is higher than the lying probability of FMs.
In ENDOGENOUS, one of the two group members is assigned, with 50% probability, to the role of the principal and the other group member to the role of the agent. The principal can decide between the role of FM and SM. The agent is informed that the principal decides on the order of moves. Our theoretical model provides three insights on the self-selection of principals: Principals with low lying costs self-select to the role of FM and report HIGH. Principals with intermediate lying costs self-select to the role of SM and report HIGH after HIGH by the FM. Principals with high lying costs are indifferent between the roles of FM and SM and report LOW in any case.
Our main research question is how the endogeneity of the order of moves influences the overall frequency of two HIGH reports in case the outcome of the lottery is LOW (that is, the frequency of unjustified high prizes). The model shows that this depends on how those principals with high lying costs who are indifferent between the roles of FM and SM.
Our experimental design follows closely the model (see the “Intervention” below for details).

Intervention

Online experiment. Between-participant design. The experiment consists of two parts. Each of the two parts is paid out with a probability of 50%.
Part I:
Participants are randomly assigned to groups of two. Both group members observe the same outcome of a lottery, which can be high or low. The group members report sequentially and receive the high prize if and only if both of them report HIGH. The second mover (SM) is informed about the report of the first mover (FM) before their own report. The outcome of the lottery is high with a probability of 25%. The high prize is £1.50 and the low prize is £0.05. The outcome of the lottery is observable to the experimenter. There are two treatments:
In treatment EXOGENOUS, participants are randomly assigned to the roles of FM or SM. For the participants’ reports, we apply the strategy method by asking participants for their report in case they are assigned to the role of FM and SM.
In treatment ENDOGENOUS, one randomly chosen participant (the “principal”) decides on the order of the reports. The other group member (the “agent”) is informed that the principal decided on the order of the two reports. Principals are first asked to choose between FM and SM, and then for their report. We apply a softer form of the strategy method for principals, as their answers for the role they know that they do not choose anyway are meaningless. However, if they decide to be SM, we ask them for their decision in case the agent as FM reported HIGH. For agents, however, we apply the strategy method by asking participants for their report in case they are assigned to the role of FM and SM.

Part II.
Participants are not paired. They take part in the same lottery where the outcome is high with a probability of 25%. Again, the high prize is £1.50 and the low prize is £0.05. The outcome of the lottery is observable to the experimenter. Each participant receives the high prize if and only if they report HIGH.

The study will be conducted on Prolific. We restrict the sample to participants whose country of residence is either the USA or UK, who have at least 500 approved assignments, and whose submissions have been approved in at least 95% of the cases. We impose these restrictions to ensure a high data quality.

After the actual experiment we ask participants for their willingness to take risks on a scale from 0-10, and for their beliefs about the behavior of other participants.

Experimental design

See description of the intervention.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer (online experiment)
Randomization unit
Experimental session for the treatment and individual for the specific role
Clusters
900
Observations
900
Arms
100 paricipants in treatment EXOGENOUS, 400 participants in treatment ENDOGENOUS PRINCIPALS, 400 participants in treatment ENDOGENOUS AGENTS
Primary outcomes
All our outcomes relate to the case when the outcome of the lottery is low. We test the following predictions and hypotheses. “Predictions” refer to Propositions from our model, while “Hypotheses” are explorative. Prediction 1a: In treatment EXOGENOUS, the likelihood that participants report HIGH is lower for participants who reported LOW in Part II of the experiment. Prediction 1b: In treatment ENDOGENOUS, the likelihood that participants report HIGH is lower for participants who reported LOW in Part II of the experiment. Prediction 1c: Considering both treatments together, the likelihood that participants report HIGH is lower for participants who reported LOW in Part II of the experiment. Prediction 2: In treatment EXOGENOUS, the likelihood that participants report HIGH as FM is lower than the likelihood that they report HIGH as SM after HIGH by FM. Prediction 3a: In treatment ENDOGENOUS, the likelihood that a principal self-selects to FM is lower for participants who reported LOW in Part II of the experiment when we neglect principals who self-select to FM and report LOW. Hypothesis 3b: In treatment ENDOGENOUS, the likelihood that a principal self-selects to FM is lower for participants who reported LOW in Part II of the experiment. Prediction 4a: The likelihood of two HIGH reports is higher in treatment ENDOGENOUS than in EXOGENOUS when we neglect principals who self-select to FM and report LOW. Hypothesis 4b: The likelihood of two HIGH reports is higher in treatment ENDOGENOUS than in EXOGENOUS. (Note: If H4b is supported by the data, this implies that H4a is supported as well. We nevertheless need both hypotheses, as it may be that only H4a is supported by the data). We test our predictions and hypotheses both non-parametrically and with regression analyses. In regressions, we control for age, gender, self-reported willingness to take risks, and the answers to the relevant belief questions.
Secondary outcomes
Impact of the aforementioned control variables.

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Keywords