Gender discrimination in hiring in poor countries: the role of trust
How to cite
Macchi, Elisa; Raisaro, Claude. 2024. "Gender discrimination in hiring in poor countries: the role of trust." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013698. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13698-1.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Gender segregation in labor markets is a prevalent issue in poor countries, leading to significant wage gaps and talent misallocation. Efforts to address this segregation by promoting female labor supply depend on the level of discrimination women face upon entering the labor market. Our study tests for gender discrimination in Uganda, characterized by severe asymmetric information problems. Partnering with a vocational training center, we conduct an experiment with employers to examine the effect of gender on hiring decisions for trainees.
Our key intuition is that, in contexts characterized by severe asymmetric information, trustworthiness is a key determinant of hiring decisions. Given the evidence that women are generally perceived as more prosocial/trustworthy, we investigate whether this perception induces a comparative advantage for women in the labor market. We conduct two primary analyses: first, we assess gender differences in hiring outcomes; second, we examine how these gender differences evolve as the relevance of asymmetric information in hiring decreases. We also examine the interplay with ability, gender preferences, and the drivers of women/men perceived differences in trustworthiness. We compare managers' beliefs about gender differences in behavior with data on actual behavior of job seekers.
Intervention
Our study investigates gender discrimination in hiring within male-dominated sectors in Uganda, focusing on the roles of trustworthiness. We partner with vocational training centers to conduct an experiment with hiring managers. Hiring managers are presented with example CVs of vocationally trained workers. These CVs represent trainee candidates and are randomly assigned to be either male or female workers. This randomization allows us to test for gender-based differences in hiring preferences. Following the IRR paradigm, managers indicate their hiring preferences based on the provided CVs, knowing that we will refer them to workers with characteristics they favor. To test the effect of asymmetric information on gender differences in hiring, we randomize the provision of monitoring support to the managers via randomized audit visits. We have a pure control arm with no monitoring support, one treatment arm where monitoring support focuses on monitoring the trainees against stealing and misbehavior (monitoring trainees) and other common misbehavior practices, and one active control arm where the monitoring support focuses on workers' safety and wellbeing (monitoring firm).
Experimental design
Each CV is randomly assigned to a combination of gender (female/male) and ability (GPA 5 out 5 / GPA 3 out of 5).
Monitoring support randomization at the manager level:
T0) Pure Control Arm: Receives no monitoring support.
T1) Monitoring Firm: Receives monitoring support in the form of audit visits focused on monitoring workers' safety and wellbeing.
T2) Monitoring Trainee: Receives monitoring support in the form of audit visits focused on monitoring trainees misbehavior (stealing, disrespect etc).
Design details
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