Gender discrimination in hiring in poor countries: the role of trust

How to cite

Macchi, Elisa; Raisaro, Claude. 2024. "Gender discrimination in hiring in poor countries: the role of trust." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013698. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13698-1.2

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Elisa Macchi* , Claude Raisaro

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013698
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13698-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2024-06-07 – 2025-08-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13698

Abstract

Gender segregation in labor markets is a prevalent issue in poor countries, leading to significant wage gaps and talent misallocation. Efforts to address this segregation by promoting female labor supply depend on the level of discrimination women face upon entering the labor market. Our study tests for gender discrimination in Uganda, characterized by severe asymmetric information problems. Partnering with a vocational training center, we conduct an experiment with employers to examine the effect of gender on hiring decisions for trainees.
Our key intuition is that, in contexts characterized by severe asymmetric information, trustworthiness is a key determinant of hiring decisions. Given the evidence that women are generally perceived as more prosocial/trustworthy, we investigate whether this perception induces a comparative advantage for women in the labor market. We conduct two primary analyses: first, we assess gender differences in hiring outcomes; second, we examine how these gender differences evolve as the relevance of asymmetric information in hiring decreases. We also examine the interplay with ability, gender preferences, and the drivers of women/men perceived differences in trustworthiness. We compare managers' beliefs about gender differences in behavior with data on actual behavior of job seekers.

Intervention

Our study investigates gender discrimination in hiring within male-dominated sectors in Uganda, focusing on the roles of trustworthiness. We partner with vocational training centers to conduct an experiment with hiring managers. Hiring managers are presented with example CVs of vocationally trained workers. These CVs represent trainee candidates and are randomly assigned to be either male or female workers. This randomization allows us to test for gender-based differences in hiring preferences. Following the IRR paradigm, managers indicate their hiring preferences based on the provided CVs, knowing that we will refer them to workers with characteristics they favor. To test the effect of asymmetric information on gender differences in hiring, we randomize the provision of monitoring support to the managers via randomized audit visits. We have a pure control arm with no monitoring support, one treatment arm where monitoring support focuses on monitoring the trainees against stealing and misbehavior (monitoring trainees) and other common misbehavior practices, and one active control arm where the monitoring support focuses on workers' safety and wellbeing (monitoring firm).

Experimental design

Each CV is randomly assigned to a combination of gender (female/male) and ability (GPA 5 out 5 / GPA 3 out of 5).

Monitoring support randomization at the manager level:

T0) Pure Control Arm: Receives no monitoring support.
T1) Monitoring Firm: Receives monitoring support in the form of audit visits focused on monitoring workers' safety and wellbeing.
T2) Monitoring Trainee: Receives monitoring support in the form of audit visits focused on monitoring trainees misbehavior (stealing, disrespect etc).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Profile gender: CV-ability level randomization; Monitoring support: manager level randomization in between-subject; cv-block level randomization for monitoring in within-subject (first 24 CVs + 12 additional CVs).
Clusters
We plan to collect data from 300 hiring managers in a sector. Should we be unable to reach our target due to insufficient firms within the Kampala metropolitan area, we will expand to additional sectors. [UPDATE]: The first sector was mechanics. Although we reached 300 firms, we identified power and external validity issues as detailed in the attached document. Consequently, we have updated our plan to expand to welding, carpentry, and gas stations. The final number of clusters will depend on the number of firms we can reach in each sector. Based on previous literature, 300 is considered an upper bound to the total number of firms within each sector.
Observations
The total number of observations equals at most the total number of respondents, times the number of CVs. In the between-subject randomization: 24 CV per manager. Within-subject randomization: 36 CV per sector in the within-subject specification.
Arms
Gender treatment: 50% male CV and 50% female CV. Monitoring treatment: 300 managers (12 to 24 CVs in each arm) per sector. [Pre-Registration Update]: Following initial data collection in the mechanics sector, we expand to additional male-dominated sectors due to observed heterogeneity in workplace gender diversity preferences, aiming to enhance external validity and statistical power as detailed in the attached document. Our main treatment and between-subject randomization remain unchanged, with the addition of a within-subject variation to further increase precision. The expansion of our data collection to new sectors increases our sample size by up to 300 observations (managers) per sector. In addition, the within-subject variation adds 12 observations (CVs) per manager.
Primary outcomes
MEET: choice of receiving the referral of a trainee like the respondent (yes/no).
Secondary outcomes
- Quality: beliefs about workers worker's skills on a 0-10 scale; - Behavior: beliefs about workers behavior (trustworthiness, honesty, skills) on a 0-10 scale; - Effort: beliefs about workers effort (hardworking, not lazy, focused, punctual) on a 0-10 scale; - Earnings: beliefs about workers' earnings a year from the experiment (UGX).

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Keywords