Competitiveness and referrals

How to cite

Munoz, Manuel. 2024. "Competitiveness and referrals." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013661. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13661-1.0

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Manuel Munoz*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013661
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13661-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-11-19 – 2023-05-10
Countries
Colombia (Bucaramanga)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13661

Abstract

This project seeks to investigate the efficacy of competitive individuals in making job referrals. While competitiveness is often prized for its role in achieving personal and organizational success, its impact on job referral quality remains ambiguous. Competitive individuals might prioritize their networks' success, resulting in high-quality referrals. Conversely, their competitive nature might lead to biased or self-serving referrals, compromising the hiring process's integrity.

To study this, I design an experiment with two phases. In the first phase, participants choose their pay scheme—competitive or performance-based—for their task performance and make their referral decisions. Each can make up to 5 referrals. In the second phase, the referred individuals perform the task independently. To identify potential channels for motivating better referrals, I design three treatments. In Treatment 1, participants are paid based on the performance of their referrals if one of them is chosen. In Treatment 2, participants are paid only if their referral’s performance matches or exceeds their own. Treatment 3 involves participants being paid only if their referral’s performance matches or exceeds that of a randomly chosen participant.

An additional question this study addresses is whether competitive individuals are more likely to recommend competitive referrals. This is an exploration into the social ties that competitive individuals activate in labor market interactions. By examining these dynamics, the study aims to provide insights into optimizing recruitment strategies and fostering a more effective and equitable hiring environment.

Experimental design

In this study, I design an experiment with two phases. In the first phase, participants choose their pay scheme—competitive or performance-based—for their task performance and make their referral decisions. In the second phase, the referred individuals perform the task independently. To identify potential channels for motivating better referrals, I design three treatments. In Treatment 1, participants are paid based on the performance of their referrals if one of them is chosen. In Treatment 2, participants are paid only if their referral’s performance matches or exceeds their own. Treatment 3 involves participants being paid only if their referral’s performance matches or exceeds that of a randomly chosen participant.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by a computer.
Randomization unit
I randomize at the individual level. That is, each individual that enters the study is randomly assigned to one of three treatments.
Clusters
I target the students of an online course. This means those in the first stage can only be those registered in the course, which is about 1400 students. Each of them can refer up to 5 others, so there can be up to 7000 referrals, for a total of 8400 observations.
Observations
about 1400 initial participants and up to 7000 referrals
Arms
There are about 460 participants in each treatment, and up to 2300 referrals in each treatment as well.
Primary outcomes
For the participants in the first and second stage, I will evaluate their performance level in the task as well as their decision to enter competition (choose they competitive pay-scheme). For those in the first stage only, I will evaluate their referral choices. I will measure the number of referrals made (between 0 and 5). I will also measure the likelihood the referral actually shows up and participates in the study.
Secondary outcomes
I will also measure is the likelihood of referring a competitive candidate, irrespective of their performance.

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Keywords