Selection into social learning

How to cite

Vorjohann, Pauline; Nei, Stephen. 2024. "Selection into social learning." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013638. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13638-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Pauline Vorjohann* , Stephen Nei

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013638
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13638-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-07-08 – 2025-05-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D01, D83, D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13638

Abstract

People often exchange information in the hopes of making improved decisions. However, if there is a cost to exchanging information, individual decisions to participate should trade off the expected benefit with this cost. When the expected benefit is the instrumental value of the gathered knowledge, economic theory suggests that one's presence is a signal of one's information, with more informed agents not finding the benefit likely to exceed the cost. This paper develops a simple model to demonstrate this point and then proceeds to test experimentally whether individuals (a) respond to costs in their information-gathering choices and (b) anticipate that other agents are strategic both in terms of their equilibrium decision of whether to gather information and in how they process the information provided by others.

Intervention

There are two bags of marbles. One contains more orange marbles and the other contains more purple marbles. For each subject, one of the two bags is chosen at random. Subjects first receive a private signal about the bag and make a guess which bag has been chosen for them. Subjects then must decide whether to pay a posted price to update their guess based on a “social signal”. The experiment has three treatments that differ in how the social signal is generated.

Experimental design

There are two bags of marbles. One contains more orange marbles and the other contains more purple marbles. For each subject, one of the two bags is chosen at random. Subjects first receive a private signal about the bag and make a guess which bag has been chosen for them. Subjects then must decide whether to pay a posted price to update their guess based on a “social signal”. The experiment has three treatments that differ in how the social signal is generated.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
400 participants
Observations
400 participants
Arms
150 treatment S, 150 treatment N, 100 treatment C
Primary outcomes
Initial guesses of the bag, initial beliefs of the likelihood of the orange bag, decisions of whether to pay for updating based on social signal, instructions for updating guess contingent on the social signal, beliefs of the likelihood of the orange bag contingent on the social signal
Secondary outcomes
beliefs that another randomly chosen subject received each possible draw realization, beliefs that another randomly chosen subject who received a particular draw realization then paid to update based on the social signal
Sponsors
Name: The British Academy Location: United Kingdom Url: https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords