Selection into social learning
How to cite
Vorjohann, Pauline; Nei, Stephen. 2024. "Selection into social learning." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013638. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13638-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
People often exchange information in the hopes of making improved decisions. However, if there is a cost to exchanging information, individual decisions to participate should trade off the expected benefit with this cost. When the expected benefit is the instrumental value of the gathered knowledge, economic theory suggests that one's presence is a signal of one's information, with more informed agents not finding the benefit likely to exceed the cost. This paper develops a simple model to demonstrate this point and then proceeds to test experimentally whether individuals (a) respond to costs in their information-gathering choices and (b) anticipate that other agents are strategic both in terms of their equilibrium decision of whether to gather information and in how they process the information provided by others.
Intervention
There are two bags of marbles. One contains more orange marbles and the other contains more purple marbles. For each subject, one of the two bags is chosen at random. Subjects first receive a private signal about the bag and make a guess which bag has been chosen for them. Subjects then must decide whether to pay a posted price to update their guess based on a “social signal”. The experiment has three treatments that differ in how the social signal is generated.
Experimental design
There are two bags of marbles. One contains more orange marbles and the other contains more purple marbles. For each subject, one of the two bags is chosen at random. Subjects first receive a private signal about the bag and make a guess which bag has been chosen for them. Subjects then must decide whether to pay a posted price to update their guess based on a “social signal”. The experiment has three treatments that differ in how the social signal is generated.
Design details
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