Voluntary Information Disclosure with Bounded Rational Agents: Experimental Evidence from the Housing Rental Market
How to cite
Sestini, Elena; Houde, Sébastien. 2024. "Voluntary Information Disclosure with Bounded Rational Agents: Experimental Evidence from the Housing Rental Market." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013606. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13606-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study explores the dynamics of voluntary information disclosure within the housing rental market, an area often characterized by asymmetric information. Employing an online experimental approach using a sender-receiver game framework, we investigate the strategic thinking and behavior of homeowners (senders) as they disclose property details to potential tenants (receivers). Through a one-time revelation game setup, we analyze the strategic interactions between senders and receivers under different conditions of information asymmetry.
The research includes two parallel experiments to separately observe the decision-making processes of senders and receivers. We test hypotheses regarding the effects of the size of the set of potential hidden values on the likelihood of information disclosure and the accuracy of the receivers' guesses. These hypotheses are examined within a within-subject treatment framework. The study specifically evaluates whether a smaller set of potential values leads to more accurate forecasts, potentially simplifying decision-making and diminishing the strategic advantage of withholding information.
Furthermore, we establish a between-subject variation framework to assess whether awareness of a specific distribution's realization encourages more frequent disclosure. Our aim is to simulate a real-world scenario related to the disclosure of climate risks to analyze decision-making under specified conditions and to provide insights that may assist policymakers in promoting voluntary information disclosure.
Intervention
The experiments are carried out with an online survey with participants recruited via Prolific. There are two distinct surveys: one for senders (proxy for owners) and one for receivers (proxy for renters). Both sides play the rental game, which is the voluntary disclosure game adapted from Jin et al. (2021): the owner must decide whether to disclose or not the quality of the house, and the renter must guess its value. The payoffs of the game are designed such that full unraveling (quality is always disclosed unless it takes the lowest value) is expected under perfect rationality.
Our goal is to test the role of bounded rationality in preventing full unraveling. We manipulate two features of the game. First, we manipulate (within-subject) the number of distinct values for quality. Each subject, must play the game with a large number of values (5), and a lower number (3 and 2) of values quality can take. As we reduce the number of values, the quality score becomes coarser and this is easier for players to understand the equilibrium outcome: i.e., no news is bad news. Second, we also manipulate (between-subject) the distribution of values, which is common knowledge. Under perfect rationality, the type of distribution should not matter, as long it is common knowledge.
Experimental design
The experimental design involves two parallel sessions to assess the elicitation of beliefs of both senders and receivers. The two sessions are performed as separate online experiments, one with the senders (Experiment 1) and one with the receivers (Experiment 2). The samples are recruited using the Prolific platform.
The experiments have a symmetric structure. First we ask for actions and then we measure beliefs. There are two treatments variations directions. The between-subjects treatment variation is designed to control for potential behavioral distortions due to the knowledge of a specific distribution of potential rating scores. The second scenario presents a within-subjects treatment variation whose objective is to check, independently of the distribution, whether the magnitude of B, the set containing all the possible values, affects the voluntary disclosure of the player. Participants will earn an additional amount according to their performance in each round. They will play a total of 10 rounds. The order of within-subjects vatiations is fairly randomised.
To provide more details, in the sender/owner experiment, participants are initially assigned to one of three between-subject treatments, each corresponding to a different probability distribution. They complete all three within-subject treatment variations, with the order being randomized. In each within- scenario, the sender is asked to decide whether to disclose or not disclose the information for each possible value; next the sender is asked to communicate his expectation about the renter's guess in case of not disclosure.
In the receiver/renter scenario, the general structure is the same. In each within- subject variation, the receiver is asked first to guess the quality score in case of non disclosure by the sender. Then, for each possible value, he has to communicate (i) whether he expects that the sender is going to disclose or not the value and (ii) the renter's guess of the sender's expectation of the renter's guess in case the sender decides not to disclose the value.
At the end of both experiments we ask four questions of a CRT, labelled as CRT-2 by Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) who proposed an alternative version to the well known CRT by Frederick (2005).
Design details
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