Characterizing Unstructured Bargaining - A Lab Experiment
How to cite
Lu, Mia; Stancsics, Martin. 2024. "Characterizing Unstructured Bargaining - A Lab Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013593. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13593-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
How can we characterize the outcomes of unstructured bargaining? We study unstructured bargaining in a lab experiment where one party has significantly more bargaining power. Players bargain in groups of three via chat. We test how well standard concepts from cooperative game theory can characterize outcomes, focusing on the Shapley value and the nucleolus.
Experimental design
- Bargaining: Every round, subjects play a coalitional game in groups of three. Subjects are assigned different player roles, one role (Player role A) has significantly more bargaining power than the other two; player A is needed to create any value. Subjects bargain over which coalition to form and how the created value is allocated between coalition members. Bargaining is free-from and takes place over chat.
- Real effort task: Subjects play a slider task before the bargaining rounds in order to motivate the assignment of bargaining power. Better performance on the task leads to a higher probability of becoming player A.
- Matching groups: We reshuffle bargaining groups within matching groups every round. The reshuffling is predetermined in order to minimize overlap between bargaining groups across rounds.
Design details
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