Fair Cooperation
How to cite
Guan, Rui; Sofianos, Andis. 2024. "Fair Cooperation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013588. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13588-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Our study investigates the impact of redistribution and its perceived fairness on individual cooperation. In a controlled experiment, participants are randomly allocated to groups of four individuals, with each group subject to varying treatment conditions. These groups are characterized by distinct redistribution rules and levels of meritocracy associated with the incentivized tasks they undertake. The impact of these treatments on cooperation is subsequently measured using a public goods game. We hypothesize that groups subjected to higher levels of redistribution exhibit increased cooperation, i.e., higher levels of contribution. Moreover, this effect tends to diminish if the fairness of the redistribution is perceived as low. The research aims to shed light on how redistribution systems can shape individual cooperative behaviour and to explore the underlying mechanisms of any such relationship.
Intervention
In the experiment, participants are randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions. These conditions are defined by unique combinations of two levels of redistribution rules—low tax and high tax—and two levels of task meritocracy—low and high. To be specific, the conditions are as follows: (1) Low Tax, Low Meritocracy; (2) High Tax, Low Meritocracy; (3) Low Tax, High Meritocracy; and (4) High Tax, High Meritocracy. In each condition, participants engage in a task that follows the same format but varies in tax and meritocracy levels. After completing this task, participants of the same treatment condition are randomly matched in groups of four members. A predetermined percentage of each member's earnings, referred to as the tax, is collected based on the assigned treatment. This tax is pooled and evenly distributed among all group members. Participants' earnings in the tasks are determined by their performance and redistribution outcomes.
Experimental design
The experiment is designed to be conducted on the platform Qualtrics, with participants recruited through Prolific. It consists of three parts, where participants engage in incentivized problem-solving tasks and economic decision-making scenarios. In the first part, participants undertake an incentivized task characterized by distinct redistribution rules and meritocracy levels based on their assigned treatment conditions. In the second part, they participate in a one-shot public good game to assess immediate cooperative behavior, without receiving any feedback from this game. In the third part, participants engage in an eight-round repeated public good game with feedback to assess cooperation dynamics across repeated interactions. Finally, participants provide information regarding their perception of fairness regarding their redistribution outcomes in the first part, as well as their personality traits and demographic characteristics.
Design details
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