Beyond labels: Exploring the impacts of stereotype-driven beliefs on cooperation, success attribution, and punishment

How to cite

Wiggen, Noud van; Delnoij, Joyce; Rezaei, Sarah; Jaegher, Kris De. 2024. "Beyond labels: Exploring the impacts of stereotype-driven beliefs on cooperation, success attribution, and punishment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013571. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13571-1.0

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Noud van Wiggen* , Joyce Delnoij , Sarah Rezaei , Kris De Jaegher

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013571
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13571-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-06-03 – 2025-06-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13571

Abstract

This study examines the existence and direction of stereotype-driven effects in a cooperative setting. Performing a lab experiment with a 2x2 treatment design using a public goods game, the study examines three hypotheses. First, whether participants expect more cooperation from women than from men. Gender stereotypes commonly describe women as more communal and men as more agentic. Such ideas can result in a higher cooperative expectation being placed on women. Secondly, the study examines whether men and women receive equal credit when evaluated for a group's success. When feedback on individual performance is ambiguous, people often engage in "attributional rationalization": estimating an individual's responsibility for a group's success by their characteristics. If stereotypes play a role here, women should receive disproportionately more credit for a group's success than men. Finally, the study examines whether higher expectations come with a drawback by including costly peer punishment. High expectations can also lead to disappointment if group success levels are low. The study examines whether women are punished more harshly than men and whether this is dependent on the expectations held by the punisher.

Experimental design

The study consists of a 2x2 treatment design implemented in lab experiments.

The experimental procedure is as follows.
We run a standard 4-player public good game with an endowment of 20 and a marginal per capita return (MPCR) of 0.4. We elicit individual beliefs about other players' contributions to the public good before and after they see the group contribution. Both belief elicitation stages are incentivized. The treatments concern the level of information on contributions that participants receive, as well as whether there is a possibility for punishment.

Each experimental session consists of five rounds of a public goods game. Each round consists of three or four stages: prediction, contribution, estimation, and punishment. Each round is performed in a group of four players. The punishment stage is only added in the punishment treatment condition.

In the prediction stage, participants are asked how much they think each of their fellow group members will contribute in the contribution stage. These predictions are incentivized: Participants can earn a bonus if they predict fellow group members' contributions exactly right.

The contribution stage is standard in a public good game: participants can choose to contribute between 0 and 20 tokens to a group project.

In the estimation stage, participants have to estimate again how much each fellow group member contributed. The difference with the prediction stage is that players now have information on the total group contribution level.

In the punishment stage, participants can reduce the earnings of other players. To do so, they can pay one token to reduce the earnings of another player by three tokens.

This experiment features a 2x2 treatment design:
- Punishment vs. No Punishment. The fourth stage is only included in sessions with the punishment treatment. In the no-punishment treatment, rounds end after the third stage.
- Full information vs. Limited information. In the full information treatment, participants are informed of the individual cooperation level of other players. They receive this information after the estimation task. Therefore, participants can make punishment decisions with more information in the "full information" treatment. In the limited information treatment, this addition is not present.

This experiment uses perfect stranger random matching. After each round of the experiment. participants are assigned to new groups.

Design details

Randomization method
Treatment will be assigned at the session level. This randomization is done through die rolls. It is made sure that each treatment occurs equally often. Within a session, participants are grouped into groups of four for each round. There are five rounds in total. Participants are rematched using perfect stranger rematching.
Randomization unit
Experimental session is the unit of randomization. Participants in the same experimental session all have the same level of treatment.
Clusters
Before July 2024: 8 sessions of 20 participants per session. 160 participants in total.
Observations
160 participants. Most of them will be students at a University or a University of Applied Sciences
Arms
Full info - Punishment: 2 sessions, 40 participants Limited info - No Punishment: 2 sessions, 40participants Full info - No Punishment: 2 session, 40 participants Limited info - Punishment: 2 session, 40 participants
Primary outcomes
- The expectations placed on other participants in the same group. Specifically, whether these expectations are higher for women than for men. Expectations are defined as the number of tokens contributed in a public goods game. We measure this by making participants estimate their fellow group members' contribution levels in an incentivized manner. - Group success evaluation: After seeing a group-level success, are people more likely to attribute the success to men or women? Success attribution is measured similarly to expectations: by having participants estimate the contribution of group members to the group project. The difference with the previous point is that participants have received an ambiguous signal: they know the total group contribution when attributing success. - Punishment: Participants can use costly peer punishment to reduce the earnings of other participants.

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Keywords