The Emergence and Dynamics of Corrupt Behavior: An Experimental Study Proposal

How to cite

Vargas, Kristian López; Arellano, Francisco Galarza. 2024. "The Emergence and Dynamics of Corrupt Behavior: An Experimental Study Proposal." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013563. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13563-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Kristian López Vargas* , Francisco Galarza Arellano

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013563
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13563-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-07-01 – 2024-08-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D73, C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13563

Abstract

This research proposal focuses on analyzing the emergence and dynamics of corrupt behavior in interactions that occur in a public goods and services provision environment. Unlike previous studies, where the roles of who is the (potential) corruptor and the framing of the possibility of corruption are rigid, our setting is more general and versatile for studying how corruption arises, initiates, and evolves over time.

Our experimental design is based on a linear public goods game, where participants are organized into groups of four and one is selected as the public official. Participants have the option to make resource transfers in private and public domains, and natural communication among players is allowed in the private domain.

This design allows us to examine how different variables and elements of the environment affect the generation and dynamics of corruption. In particular, we focus on studying how the combination of the possibility of private interaction and the unequal allocation of public resources (both intrinsic elements of modern societies) can contribute to the emergence of this phenomenon. We then explore how these corrupt or non-cooperative relationships evolve over time or with changes in interaction rules. Finally, we investigate the impact of various anti-corruption policies in this more realistic setting. Our central purpose is to contribute empirical evidence for a deeper understanding of the corruption phenomenon and to inform effective policies and mechanisms to prevent it.

Intervention

The study involves a linear public goods game where participants are organized into groups of four, with one randomly selected as the public official. Participants can make resource transfers in both private and public domains, and natural communication among players is allowed in the private domain.

Experimental design

The experimental design involves a linear public goods game structured to explore the dynamics of corrupt behavior. In this setup, participants are grouped into quartets, where they interact under assigned roles with one acting as a public official. Each participant, including the public official, is given an initial endowment they can allocate to a public project or engage in private transactions. The game allows participants to communicate privately, providing a realistic setting to examine both overt and covert interactions.

This framework facilitates the examination of how individual actions in private settings influence collective outcomes in a public setting. Specifically, the design tests how private resource transfers and public contributions interplay, and how these behaviors affect the distribution of public goods by the official. The study’s public aspect emphasizes the interaction patterns and decision-making processes without revealing specific manipulative interventions used to provoke corrupt behaviors.

Design details

Randomization method
Participants were randomly assigned to different roles and treatment conditions using a computerized random number generator. This randomization ensures each participant has an equal chance of being placed in any of the roles, including that of the public official, thus preventing any biases.
Randomization unit
Randomization was conducted at the individual level within each experimental session. Each participant was individually randomized to a specific role and to different treatment conditions to ensure the independence and integrity of the assignment process.
Clusters
0
Observations
900
Arms
100 baseline 1 (BL1), 100 baseline 2 (BL2), 100 treatment 1 (T1), 100 treatment 2 (T2), 100 treatment 3 (T3), 100 treatment 4 (T4), 100 treatment 5 (T5), 100 treatment 6 (T6), 100 treatment 7 (T7)
Primary outcomes
Quantity of private transfers between participants, quantity of contributions to the public good, and the distribution of public resources by the public official.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords