Improving Third-Party Audits and Regulatory Compliance in India
How to cite
Greenstone, Michael; Ryan, Nicholas; Pande, Rohini; Duflo, Esther. 2016. "Improving Third-Party Audits and Regulatory Compliance in India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001355. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1355-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In many regulated markets, private, third-party auditors are chosen and
paid by the firms that they audit, potentially creating a conflict of interest. This
article reports on a two-year field experiment in the Indian state of Gujarat
that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental
audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. There
are three main results. First, the status quo system was largely corrupted, with
auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard, although
true emissions were typically higher. Second, the treatment caused
auditors to report more truthfully and very significantly lowered the fraction
of plants that were falsely reported as compliant with pollution standards.
Third, treatment plants, in turn, reduced their pollution emissions. The results
suggest reformed incentives for third-party auditors can improve their reporting
and make regulation more effective.
Experimental design
This experiment sought to curb a conflict of interest in the enforcement of industrial emissions standards by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. It was conducted in collaboration with the environmental regulatory body in Gujarat, India. Ordinarily, auditors are chosen by, paid by, and report to the audited firm. Beginning with two populations of industrial plants from two regions of Gujarat, half of the industrial plants in each region were randomized into a treatment with four parts. First, treatment plants were randomly assigned an auditor they were required to use. Second, auditors were paid from a central pool, rather than by the plant. Third, a random sample of each auditor's pollution readings were verified with follow-up visits (backchecks) to the audited plants by an independent technical agency. Fourth, at the start of the second year, treatment auditors were informed that their pay would be linked to their reporting accuracy, as measured by these backchecks. Data were collected from audit reports filed with the regulator, and from the agencies conducting backcheck readings.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Duflo, Esther, Michael Greenstone, Rohini Pande, and Nicholas Ryan. 2013. "Truth-Telling by Third-Party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4): 1499-1545. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/156_321_QJE_2013_Truth_Telling_Third_Party_Audits.pdf
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