Improving Third-Party Audits and Regulatory Compliance in India

How to cite

Greenstone, Michael; Ryan, Nicholas; Pande, Rohini; Duflo, Esther. 2016. "Improving Third-Party Audits and Regulatory Compliance in India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001355. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1355-1.0

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Michael Greenstone* , Nicholas Ryan , Rohini Pande , Esther Duflo

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001355
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1355-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2008-01-01 – 2011-12-31
Countries
India (South Asia)
JEL codes
Q56, M42, D22
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1355

Abstract

In many regulated markets, private, third-party auditors are chosen and
paid by the firms that they audit, potentially creating a conflict of interest. This
article reports on a two-year field experiment in the Indian state of Gujarat
that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental
audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. There
are three main results. First, the status quo system was largely corrupted, with
auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard, although
true emissions were typically higher. Second, the treatment caused
auditors to report more truthfully and very significantly lowered the fraction
of plants that were falsely reported as compliant with pollution standards.
Third, treatment plants, in turn, reduced their pollution emissions. The results
suggest reformed incentives for third-party auditors can improve their reporting
and make regulation more effective.

Experimental design

This experiment sought to curb a conflict of interest in the enforcement of industrial emissions standards by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting. It was conducted in collaboration with the environmental regulatory body in Gujarat, India. Ordinarily, auditors are chosen by, paid by, and report to the audited firm. Beginning with two populations of industrial plants from two regions of Gujarat, half of the industrial plants in each region were randomized into a treatment with four parts. First, treatment plants were randomly assigned an auditor they were required to use. Second, auditors were paid from a central pool, rather than by the plant. Third, a random sample of each auditor's pollution readings were verified with follow-up visits (backchecks) to the audited plants by an independent technical agency. Fourth, at the start of the second year, treatment auditors were informed that their pay would be linked to their reporting accuracy, as measured by these backchecks. Data were collected from audit reports filed with the regulator, and from the agencies conducting backcheck readings.

Design details

Randomization method
In each of the two regions, half the plants were randomized into the treatment
Randomization unit
industrial plants
Clusters
no clusters
Observations
633 industrial plants in provisional sample
Arms
233 industrial plants treatment 240 industrial plants control
Primary outcomes
Audits Submitted Narrow Compliance in Audits Relative to Backchecks (dummy for pollutant between 75% and 100% of regulatory standard): (All Pollutants/Water Pollutants/Air Pollutants) (Control Group) Compliance in Audits Relative to Backchecks (dummy for pollutant at or below regulatory standard): (All Pollutants/Water Pollutants/Air Pollutants) (Control Group) Narrow Compliance in Audits Relative to Backchecks (dummy for pollutant between 75% and 100% of regulatory standard): (All Pollutants/Water Pollutants/Air Pollutants) (Treatment Group) Compliance in Audits Relative to Backchecks (dummy for pollutant at or below regulatory standard): (All Pollutants/Water Pollutants/Air Pollutants) (Control Group) (Treatment Group) Audit Treatment Effects on Auditor Reporting: Compliance (dummy for pollutant in audit report at or below regulatory standard) Audit Treatment Effects on Auditor Reporting: Level of pollutant in audit report (standard deviations relative to backcheck mean) Audit Treatment Effects on Auditor Reporting: Level of pollutant in audit report minus level of pollution in backcheck (standard deviations) Endline Pollution Concentrations on Treatment Status: Level of pollutant in endline survey, all pollutants (standard deviations relative to backcheck mean) Endline Pollution Concentrations on Treatment Status: Dependent variable: Compliance (dummy for pollutant in endline survey at or below regulatory standard)

Papers from this trial

  1. Duflo, Esther, Michael Greenstone, Rohini Pande, and Nicholas Ryan. 2013. "Truth-Telling by Third-Party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4): 1499-1545. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/156_321_QJE_2013_Truth_Telling_Third_Party_Audits.pdf

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Keywords