The role of an intermediary in carbon offset markets: theory and experiment

How to cite

Shen, Peiyao; Friesen, Lana; MacKenzie, Ian. 2024. "The role of an intermediary in carbon offset markets: theory and experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013542. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13542-1.0

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Peiyao Shen* , Lana Friesen , Ian MacKenzie

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013542
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13542-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2024-05-06 – 2025-05-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13542

Abstract

This lab experiment investigates how a market intermediary affects the outcomes of a carbon offset market, and how a contractual mechanism can deliver the most socially desirable outcomes. A market intermediary is hypothesized to enhance market participation and market supplies through contract designs. In a baseline treatment, no intermediary or contract is provided to market suppliers who undertake both the production costs and market entry fees. Two intermediary treatments introduce two types of contracts: (1) a fixed price contract for each unit of supply; and (2) an uncertain price contract where the unit income is a share of the realized market price. In both intermediary treatments, the contract is provided to suppliers who have a high market entry fee, which can be avoided by accepting the contract price instead of the realized market price. This experiment also elicits subjects’ risk attitudes and demographic information.

Experimental design

This is a laboratory experiment, conducted in a standard university experimental economics lab, recruiting students broadly across the university. Subjects will be randomly assigned to treatments, and then randomly assigned to roles (high entry cost and low entry cost) and into groups of four to make a choice.
The main experimental task involves subjects making decisions about supplying units of a fictitious good to the market with varying production costs and entry fees. In the baseline, a subject decides to provide goods independently, and the unit income will be the uncertain market price realized only after all subjects have made their supply decisions. In the treatments, everything remains the same except that we introduce the possibility of providing market supply through an aggregator and a computerized aggregator provides either a guaranteed price or a share of the realized market price as the contract price to subjects. The experiment also elicits subjects’ risk attitudes and standard demographic information, which would be used as control variables in regression specifications.

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects will be recruited by email using SONA system. They choose between a list of available sessions, and the session is randomized to a treatment before it is initialized.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
24 groups of 4 subjects, and 12 individuals
Observations
108 individuals
Arms
12 individuals in baseline (individual decision-making) 48 individuals in fixed-price treatment 48 individuals in share price treatment
Primary outcomes
Individual market supplies; Total market supply; Market participation rates; Social welfare.

Cited by

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Keywords