Needs-Based Targeting of Anti-Poverty Transfers: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy? Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Rural Uganda
How to cite
Treurniet, Mark; Dongen, Lisa van. 2024. "Needs-Based Targeting of Anti-Poverty Transfers: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy? Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Rural Uganda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013492. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13492-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
While poverty has continued to persist, policy makers have implemented a range of anti-poverty transfer programs. Various strands of economic and psychological literature have documented both intended and unintended effects of anti-poverty transfers, including increased feelings of inferiority. This study extends the literature by examining how anti-poverty transfers may lead to such feelings of inferiority and hence also to lower investments. First, we develop a theoretical model in which individuals internalize signals from transfers. We predict that recipients of targeted transfers will negatively update their beliefs about their returns to investments and therefore reduce investments, compared to similar recipients of universal transfers. Next, we will test the model’s predictions withWe organize a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural Uganda to test whether participants internalize signals from either needs-based or universal anti-poverty transfers, and change their investment decisions accordingly. Our results will help to understand the impact of different types of anti-poverty transfers, and thereby help to design effective anti-poverty strategies.
Intervention
After a first round with six investment decisions, we introduce anti-poverty transfers that are given either (i) indirectly targeted to the participants that earned the least with completing sorting tasks in the first round, (ii) directly targeted to the types with a low reward for completed sorting tasks or (iii) universally given to all participants.
Experimental design
We organize a lab-in-the-field experiment in which participants repeatedly can either choose for a fixed compensation, or choose to invest in a sorting task and potentially earn a higher amount. The reward for completing the sorting task depends on their randomized reward type, which is unknown to participants at the start of the game. After a first round with six investment decisions, we introduce anti-poverty transfers that are given either (i) indirectly targeted to the participants that earned the least with completing sorting tasks in the first round, (ii) directly targeted to the types with a low reward for completed sorting tasks or (iii) universally given to all participants, where the first and second contain a signal about the participants’ reward type.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.