Knowledge Hoarding
How to cite
Swanson, Nicholas; Cefala, Luisa; Naso, Pedro; Irakoze, Franck. 2024. "Knowledge Hoarding." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013436. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13436-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The diffusion of new technologies is a crucial driver for growth in low-income countries, especially in the agricultural sector. Motivated by theory, researchers and policymakers have relied on networks as a source of rapid knowledge diffusion, yet often with modest empirical results, suggesting that information transmission is not frictionless. We propose a mechanism that might prevent information diffusion: “knowledge hoarding.” In settings where early technology adopters (incumbents) derive rents from it, they might strategically halt its diffusion to preserve the rent their knowledge grants them. This project asks whether knowledge hoarding limit aggregate productivity gains because of distributional consequences generated by knowledge diffusion. We study this question in the context of modern agricultural technologies in Burundi, where agents already trained in the new technology (incumbents) have a private incentive not to share knowledge in the labor market: they face higher labor demand and a wage premium from mastering the planting technologies. We design two experiments to quantify the effect of knowledge hoarding on knowledge diffusion, and to show the distributional and aggregate consequences of knowledge hoarding on labor market equilibria, technology adoption, and productivity.
Intervention
In this project, we conduct two different sets of experiments that identify different incentives that workers have to “hoard” knowledge from others. In this pre-registration we describe one set of experiments, the second set of experiments is described in a separate document, which will be published before those experiments are run.
In this experiment, we measure the effects of hoarding behavior on labor market outcomes. To do this we identify workers in each village who are skilled in row-planting/microdosage, and workers who are unskilled in these techniques. Villages are then assigned to one of three treatment arms:
1) Pure Control – Nothing occurs
2) Low Saturation – skilled workers are invited to a training event. At this training event, they are asked to spend the entire day with unskilled workers. At this event, they are told that they can use the time together to do different activies, one of which is teaching the other workers row-planting and fertilizer microdosage. Unskilled workers in this treatment are from the same village (labor market).
3) High Saturation – everything is the same as the low saturation condition except that unskilled workers in this treatment live in different villages (labor markets).
4) Placebo – same as 2) and 3), but with a placebo task (non-competitive)
Experimental design
We sample in all villages a set of laborers who have skills in row-planting/fertilizer microdosage, as well as a set of unskilled laborers. In pure control villages, no activities occur. In treatment villages, skilled workers are invited to a training event. At this training event, they are asked to spend the entire day with unskilled workers. At this event, they are told that they can use the time together to do different activities, one of which is teaching the other workers row-planting and fertilizer microdosage. In low saturation villages, unskilled workers in this treatment are from the same village (labor market). Whereas in high saturation villages, unskilled workers in this treatment are from the same village (labor market).
We then measure outcomes (labor market, technology adoption) over the course of the following agricultural season. We measure outcomes both for laborers invited to the training event, as well as spillover laborers, which comprise a random sample of laborers uninvited to the training event (both skilled and unskilled).
Design details
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