Knowledge Hoarding

How to cite

Swanson, Nicholas; Cefala, Luisa; Naso, Pedro; Irakoze, Franck. 2024. "Knowledge Hoarding." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013436. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13436-1.0

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Nicholas Swanson* , Luisa Cefala , Pedro Naso , Franck Irakoze

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013436
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13436-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-12-01 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13436

Abstract

The diffusion of new technologies is a crucial driver for growth in low-income countries, especially in the agricultural sector. Motivated by theory, researchers and policymakers have relied on networks as a source of rapid knowledge diffusion, yet often with modest empirical results, suggesting that information transmission is not frictionless. We propose a mechanism that might prevent information diffusion: “knowledge hoarding.” In settings where early technology adopters (incumbents) derive rents from it, they might strategically halt its diffusion to preserve the rent their knowledge grants them. This project asks whether knowledge hoarding limit aggregate productivity gains because of distributional consequences generated by knowledge diffusion. We study this question in the context of modern agricultural technologies in Burundi, where agents already trained in the new technology (incumbents) have a private incentive not to share knowledge in the labor market: they face higher labor demand and a wage premium from mastering the planting technologies. We design two experiments to quantify the effect of knowledge hoarding on knowledge diffusion, and to show the distributional and aggregate consequences of knowledge hoarding on labor market equilibria, technology adoption, and productivity.

Intervention

In this project, we conduct two different sets of experiments that identify different incentives that workers have to “hoard” knowledge from others. In this pre-registration we describe one set of experiments, the second set of experiments is described in a separate document, which will be published before those experiments are run.

In this experiment, we measure the effects of hoarding behavior on labor market outcomes. To do this we identify workers in each village who are skilled in row-planting/microdosage, and workers who are unskilled in these techniques. Villages are then assigned to one of three treatment arms:

1) Pure Control – Nothing occurs
2) Low Saturation – skilled workers are invited to a training event. At this training event, they are asked to spend the entire day with unskilled workers. At this event, they are told that they can use the time together to do different activies, one of which is teaching the other workers row-planting and fertilizer microdosage. Unskilled workers in this treatment are from the same village (labor market).
3) High Saturation – everything is the same as the low saturation condition except that unskilled workers in this treatment live in different villages (labor markets).
4) Placebo – same as 2) and 3), but with a placebo task (non-competitive)

Experimental design

We sample in all villages a set of laborers who have skills in row-planting/fertilizer microdosage, as well as a set of unskilled laborers. In pure control villages, no activities occur. In treatment villages, skilled workers are invited to a training event. At this training event, they are asked to spend the entire day with unskilled workers. At this event, they are told that they can use the time together to do different activities, one of which is teaching the other workers row-planting and fertilizer microdosage. In low saturation villages, unskilled workers in this treatment are from the same village (labor market). Whereas in high saturation villages, unskilled workers in this treatment are from the same village (labor market).

We then measure outcomes (labor market, technology adoption) over the course of the following agricultural season. We measure outcomes both for laborers invited to the training event, as well as spillover laborers, which comprise a random sample of laborers uninvited to the training event (both skilled and unskilled).

Design details

Randomization method
Office by computer
Randomization unit
Village
Clusters
Approximately 140 villages
Observations
At most 60 individuals will be surveyed per village, meaning a total sample size of at most 8,400 individuals
Arms
40-43 pure control, low saturation and high saturation villages. We sample 10 villages for the placebo arm.
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcomes are: 1) Employment (days worked) doing row-planting and fertilizer microdosage 2) Total employment during the agricultural season (days worked) and unemployment 3) Average wage 4) Total Earnings 5) Usage of row-planting and fertilizer microdosage on own-farm fields
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes include: - Number of fields that the worker is hired to do row planting on. - Other amenities offered by employers in contracts - Labor market turnover - Attitudes and beliefs towards those who do not know how to do row-planting and microdosage - Prestige associated with being able to do row planting.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords