Entitlement and Corruption: An Experiment

How to cite

Zhang, Dexuan. 2024. "Entitlement and Corruption: An Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013403. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13403-1.0

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Dexuan Zhang*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0013403
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13403-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2024-04-20 – 2024-05-12
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/13403

Abstract

We experimentally examine how the selection process of public officials (POs) impacts their corrupt activities via a fostered sense of entitlement. We propose that entitlement effects vary with the selection method, with ability-based selections possibly height- ening corruption, while prosociality-based ones might mitigate it. Our experimental design entails a two-stage process where the first stage involves an ability contest and a prosociality contest. The second stage is a bribery game where citizens in each group compete for a prize and can bribe the PO in charge. We control the sense of enti- tlement and its source by whether or not announcing which contest determines the appointment of POs. We analyze how various selection methods shape bribery and corruption through the lens of social norms, moral costs, and greed. Our findings offer insights into the relationship between public sector recruitment policies and integrity in governance.

Experimental design

We experimentally examine how the selection process of public officials (POs) impacts their corrupt activities via a fostered sense of entitlement. We propose that entitlement effects vary with the selection method, with ability-based selections possibly heightening corruption, while prosociality-based ones might mitigate it. Our experimental design entails a two-stage process where the first stage involves an ability contest of general knowledge and a prosociality contest of public goods game contribution. The second stage is a three-person bribery game where two citizens in each group compete for a prize and can bribe the PO in charge. We control the sense of entitlement and its source by whether or not announcing which contest determines the appointment of POs. Based on the information condition and the PO selection rule, we have a 2x2 between-subject design: unknown-ability contest (UAC), unknown moral contest (UMC), known ability contest (KAC), and known moral contest (KMC).

Design details

Randomization method
We have four treatment groups, a 2x2 between-subject design: unknown-ability contest (UAC), unknown moral contest (UMC), known ability contest (KAC), and known moral contest (KMC). All four groups of subjects were recruited from the sample pool of undergraduate students in a Chinese university and entered into different sessions. The treatment for each session was randomly determined by a computer. More specifically, we published the experimental recruitment of our different sessions in the test library, and the subjects freely chose to participate in a certain session, and the recruitment information of these sessions did not contain any other information except the experiment time.
Randomization unit
Experimental sessions.
Clusters
12 sessions
Observations
576 subjects
Arms
48 subjects per session, 3 sessions per treatment
Primary outcomes
Subjects' decisions in a bribery game.

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Keywords