Entitlement and Corruption: An Experiment
How to cite
Zhang, Dexuan. 2024. "Entitlement and Corruption: An Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0013403. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.13403-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
We experimentally examine how the selection process of public officials (POs) impacts their corrupt activities via a fostered sense of entitlement. We propose that entitlement effects vary with the selection method, with ability-based selections possibly height- ening corruption, while prosociality-based ones might mitigate it. Our experimental design entails a two-stage process where the first stage involves an ability contest and a prosociality contest. The second stage is a bribery game where citizens in each group compete for a prize and can bribe the PO in charge. We control the sense of enti- tlement and its source by whether or not announcing which contest determines the appointment of POs. We analyze how various selection methods shape bribery and corruption through the lens of social norms, moral costs, and greed. Our findings offer insights into the relationship between public sector recruitment policies and integrity in governance.
Experimental design
We experimentally examine how the selection process of public officials (POs) impacts their corrupt activities via a fostered sense of entitlement. We propose that entitlement effects vary with the selection method, with ability-based selections possibly heightening corruption, while prosociality-based ones might mitigate it. Our experimental design entails a two-stage process where the first stage involves an ability contest of general knowledge and a prosociality contest of public goods game contribution. The second stage is a three-person bribery game where two citizens in each group compete for a prize and can bribe the PO in charge. We control the sense of entitlement and its source by whether or not announcing which contest determines the appointment of POs. Based on the information condition and the PO selection rule, we have a 2x2 between-subject design: unknown-ability contest (UAC), unknown moral contest (UMC), known ability contest (KAC), and known moral contest (KMC).
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.